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This thesis investigates how communication between civilians and military elites 
can create better defense institutions. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the 9/11 
Commission Report are used as case studies to analyze the creation of the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and how it reformed defense institutions. 
This thesis examines the causes, processes, results, and implementations of the two case 
studies to determine the level of civil-military relations used in U.S. defense reform. 
Rational political interests are revealed as the major concern for U.S. elites responsible 
for passing laws in the executive, legislative, and military branches. When rational 
interests become the main concern, however, it is difficult to achieve effective defense 
institutions. This thesis recommends continuous defense reforms, instead of reactionary 
reforms, for two reasons: ensuring the effectiveness of defense institutions and achieving 
better communication between civilian and military elites.  
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This thesis examines the differences in enacting and implementing two defense 
reform policies; of particular interest is the way that civilians and the military acted with 
respect to matters of defense effectiveness. This thesis explores why the United States 
reformed its institutions through the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that largely adopted the 9/11 commission 
recommendations on reforming the Intelligence Community, as well as the impact for 
defense reform in United States on civilian control of defense institutions and defense 
effectiveness. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Civil-military relations is the relationship between the military and the people 
outside of the military organization in a nation-state. Elliot A. Cohen defines normal 
civil-military relations as a relation that has clear distinction of responsibilities between 
the civilian and military.1 Further Cohen argues that “political leaders should develop 
objectives, provide resources, set broad parameters for action, and select a commander—
then step back, and intervene only to replace him should he fail at his task.”2 The balance 
of normal civil-military relations is important, not only overtime but also to enhance 
effectiveness of the military. 
In order to reach the purpose of this thesis, the relation between the intelligence 
community and the civilian are categorized as a subset of the military in civil-military 
relations.3 The intelligence community is categorized as a subset of the military in the 
civil-military realm in this thesis because of the similarity in the tensions between the 
                                                 
1 Elliot A. Cohen, “Supreme Command in 21st Century,” Joint Forces Quarterly no. 31 (Summer 
2002): 49, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-31.pdf. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Thomas C. Bruneau and Kenneth R. Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence: The Challenge of Control 
in New Democracies,” in Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, 
edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Toffelson (Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press, 2006), 
145; Alfred Stepan, “The Brazilian Intelligence System in Comparative Perspective,” in Rethinking 
Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 13–29. 
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military and intelligence communities as they relate to democracy.4 Also, particularly in 
the United States, the military that dominated intelligence community prior to the 1947 
Security Act, still dominates the intelligence community today.5  
In principle, the U.S. security organizations should ensure the security of the 
nation itself and the nation’s interests throughout the world. In the last three decades, the 
United States has reorganized the fundamentals of its security sector twice. The first 
change focused on reorganization and control of the armed forces; the second, on the 
intelligence community. Civil-military tensions over reform were—and are—
unsurprising, as civilians determine how the military has to fight and how the intelligence 
agencies must act.  
Different degrees of civilian and military support for defense effectiveness 
colored both reforms from their beginnings. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 changed 
the armed forces’ way of fighting and organizing. Domestic political support in the 
legislative and executive branches and among the military leadership was mixed. Some 
politicians and military officers liked how the armed forces performed and thought that 
the people with the most expertise in the job should determine how the armed forces want 
to work.6 On the other hand, after some conspicuous failures, others, including senior 
military officials, thought that the armed forces needed to change.7 The public was 
largely absent from the debate. 
The 9/11 Commission enjoyed something that the Goldwater-Nichols Act did not 
have: broad and unified popular support. After the unfortunate disasters of September 11, 
2001, the people of the United States came together. The threat of further attacks on 
American soil effectively united the nation. The civilian leadership both blamed the 
intelligence organizations for failing to prevent the attacks and expected them to make 
rapid changes to protect the nation from further attacks. The people demanded fast action. 
                                                 
4 Bruneau and Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence,” 145. 
5 Ibid., 170. 
6 James R. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac, ed. Joseph G. Dawson III (College Station, TX: Texas 
A&M University Press, 2002), 4–5.  
7 Ibid.  
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Even here, though, there was political infighting over both the constitution of the 9/11 
Commission and implementation of intelligence reform. Congress passed the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act in 2004. The civilian leadership and the military—
in this case, including the intelligence community—worked at odds with the 9/11 
Commission to control how reform would take place.   
B. IMPORTANCE 
The United States, undoubtedly, is the strongest military power in the world. 
Moreover, the United States also actively promotes democracy throughout the world. One 
aspect of U.S. democracy that garners great attention is a military under strong 
democratic control. The long success of strong democratic control over the U.S. military 
does not mean that there have not been tensions between civilians and military. The 
problems range from the effectiveness in many aspects of the military as the guardian of 
the nation to the trust between the civilian leadership and the security institutions. 
With respect to trust, Cohen argues that, “In the United States politicians fret over 
military options while soldiers complain about micromanagement, interference, and 
ambiguous guidance.”8 Trust between civilian and military leaders has been in question 
at times. In this light, Strobe Talbott quotes Nikita Khrushchev: “The President is not 
sure that the military will not overthrow him and seize power. The American Army could 
get out of control.”9 Today, a military coup in the United States is highly unlikely, but the 
views of the military still have political significance in shaping the nation’s defense 
policy, and even the nation’s foreign policy.    
Relating the civil-military relations in United States to the condition of 
effectiveness, Christopher E. Gibson offers his view that “functional civil-military 
relations do not guarantee successful policy outcomes, but dysfunction in this critical area 
                                                 
8 Cohen, “Supreme Command,” 49. 
9 Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remember, ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston, MA: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1970), 498. Even though it was unproven that the military was likely to overthrow 
the United States government, Khrushchev had thought about that possibility based on the situation at hand 
and believed that it was likely to happen.    
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is sure to produce incomplete options and ineffective outcomes.”10 Thomas Bruneau, 
similarly, writes that: 
Democratic civilian control of the armed forces is not an issue in any of 
the reform initiatives … instead, the focus is on effectiveness, which is 
impeded by the institutions, and their relationships with one another … 
virtually all issues of government, including the reform of institutions and 
personnel, are worked out, or more commonly kicked down the road, in a 
highly politicized environment.11  
These two arguments from the scholars in the United States civil-military relations field 
showed that even decent civil-military relations must be examined to create an effective 
defense sector. The relations between civilians and the military were important but not 
the focus of defense reforms. Instead, effectiveness was the main purpose of reform, and 
functional civil-military relations were a means to achieve effectiveness in defense 
reforms. 
In a democracy, national security reforms ought to reflect the people’s 
expectations regarding a defense system that reinforces two aims: civilian control of the 
armed forces and intelligence services (including appropriate use of taxpayer dollars), 
and the preparedness and effectiveness of these services. The passage of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 offer an 
opportunity to investigate the extent to which security reform designed to improve 
defense effectiveness are carried out in accordance with the nation’s interests, as a 
concern for the national, rather than narrow interests, would expect. These laws were 
created in two different contexts and circumstances of necessity. The passage and 
implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act need to be examined to assess whether defense reform reflect a these twin 
goals.  
The Goldwater-Nichols Act took almost four years to pass. Congress initiated this 
act in the wake of several high-visibility military failures: the inconclusive results of the 
                                                 
10 Christopher P. Gibson, “Enhancing National Security and Civilian Control of the Military: A 
Madisonian Approach,” in American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and The State in the New Era, 
ed. Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snyder (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2009), 239.  
11 Bruneau, Patriot for Profits, 105.  
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Korean War 1950–1953, the Vietnam War 1955–1975, Operation Eagle Claw 1980, the 
Beirut Marine barracks bombing in 1983, and the Grenada invasion of 1983.12 This act 
required long negotiations between Congress and the civilian and military leaders in 
DOD, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some in the military thought that Congress had 
no idea what the armed forces were doing and, thus, should defer to the military as the 
expert in controlling violence.13 General John A. Wickham Jr., for example, vividly 
stated that the reform coming from Congress would cost the United States its national 
security.14 On the other hand, Congress, as the people’s representatives, has the power to 
regulate the military, and, in its view, the armed forces needed to follow the people of the 
United States.15 It was clear that there were gaps between civilians and the military on 
this matter.  
In contrast, the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that 
changed the United States defense intelligence sector took less than a year to be passed 
into public law after the 9/11 Commission issued its recommendations for intelligence 
reform. Even though the 9/11 attacks were blamed on the intelligence community, 
including the U.S. defense intelligence sector, Congress seemed to have faith in the 
executive branch, especially the defense agencies, would implement the 
recommendations in order to protect the nation.16 There were no strong disagreements 
from the intelligence community.17 Reform ensued relatively quickly.  
It seems that the civil-military situation before and during the passage of these 
reforms influenced the tone and nature of the laws that express them.  Given the civil-
military context, the proposed thesis asks: What led to the enactment of these laws, and 
have they strengthened civilian control of the military in the United States? 
                                                 
12 Locher, Victory on the Potomac, 4.  
13 Ibid., 3–12.  
14 Ibid., 3. 
15 Ibid., 4. 
16 Thomas C. Bruneau, Patriots For Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security, 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 87. 
17 Ibid.  
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Even though civil-military relations in the United States are hardly in crisis, it is 
important to investigate how effective the defense reform of the nation is as a political 
product of the collaboration of the civilian and military in a relatively high civilian 
control over the military. The results of the reform process are important because defense 
sector reform could weaken or strengthen the relation between the civilian and military 
leaders in their collaboration to keep the nation secure. In the United States, gaps and 
divisions exist between the leaders of the civilians and the military.18 The differences 
between civilian and military leaders appeared vividly when high ranking military 
officers disagreed with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the matter of 
transforming the United States military from a Cold War force to become a more 
responsive force.19 Also, in 2006, numerous retired high-ranking military officers openly 
criticized the administration’s defense policy.20 This thesis assesses if such tensions have 
led to out-of-focus defense policy that negatively impacts U.S. defense effectiveness. The 
Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Intelligence Reform Act are argued to be examples of 
policy that tended to create a more effective defense sector; this thesis will evaluate this 
claim.  
Based on a review of the relevant literature, there are two sets of hypotheses that 
this thesis evaluates to answer the following two questions: What has driven the 
enactment of defense reform in the United States? And, has the enactment of defense 
reform strengthened the effectiveness of the defense institutions in the United States?  
The potential explanations for why defense reform in the United States was 
enacted are: calculations regarding the civilian leaders’ and military agencies political 
interests drove the enactment of security reform; changes in the U.S. strategic 
environment drove the enactment of security reform; and lack of security effectiveness 
(military and intelligence failures) drove the enactment of defense reform. It is 
                                                 
18 Mackubin Thomas Owen, U.S. Civil-Military Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military 
Bargain (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), 3. 
19 Ibid., 4. 
20 Ibid. 
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hypothesized that the most effective type of reform is that initiated in response to the 
changes in the strategic environment. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review discusses the framework of civil-military relations in the 
United States, and also surveys scholars’ contributions regarding the causes of defense 
reform and the impact of defense reform on civil-military relations in the United States.   
1. Civil-military Relations in the United States and Defense Reform 
Democratic civilian control in United States has been a crucial issue for scholars 
and leaders in the United States, not only because it affects millions of people who work 
for the U.S. DOD, but also because the civilian oversight function mandated by the 
constitution can be complicated.21 Congress has the mandate from the constitution to 
“raise and support armies and a navy, declare war, and to regulate the relationship with 
the state militias.”22 The constitution vests the power of Commander in Chief in the U.S. 
President.23  
According to William W. Kauffman, the defense community (here defined to 
include both the military and the intelligence agencies) in the United States is therefore in 
an ambiguous situation between two authorities: the Congress and the president.24 
Michael F. Morris argues that, “At times, the division of power and responsibility 
between the executive and legislative branches of the government has created difficult 
situations for military leaders as they have sought to respond to the sometimes different 
interests and viewpoints of the Congress and the president.”25 Morris offers the example 
of General Eric Shinseki’s testimony in the front of Congress in 2003 about the number 
                                                 
21 Michael F. Morris, “The Military and Congress,” in Inside Defense: Understanding the U.S. 
Military in the 21st Century, ed. Derek S. Reveron and Judith Hicks Stiehm (New York: St. Martin’s, 
2008), 92–93.  
22 William W. Kauffmann, “Foreword,” in National Security and U.S. Constitution: The Impact of the 
Political System, ed. George C. Edwards III and Wallace Earl Walker (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1988), vii. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., ix. 
25 Ibid., 93.  
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of troops needed to win the war in Iraq, which was different from Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld’s opinion and led to Shinseki’s early announcement of retirement.26 
The mechanism of democratic civilian control in United States are more likely to make 
the military work under two different leaders: the executive and the legislative. 27 For this 
reason, defense effectiveness requires an extraordinary understanding between the leaders 
in the executive branch and the Congress. The divided civilian of the U.S. defense 
services expands the circle of those seeking reform to correct perceived problems. It also 
allows military and intelligence officials to seek allies in the executive and legislative 
branches to pursue particular their parochial prerogatives. 
The civilian reformers and the military may not share fundamental values. Paul 
Gronke and Peter D. Feaver argue that elite military officers think that civilian society in 
United States is troubled and needs to accept military values to be fixed, and the civilian 
elites believe that traditional military culture is not important, especially in the values of 
liberal Americans.28 These differences appeared starkly in the effort of President Bill 
Clinton’s administration sought to force the military to accept homosexuals in the armed 
forces. In 1993, the effort faced strong disagreement from General Colin Powell, the 
Chief of Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and almost all military leaders.29 Eventually 
homosexual get accepted in the United States military, but such disagreement is an 
example of real factor in U.S. civil-military relations. It does not mean that national 
security in the United States is in jeopardy, but gaps between civil-military views in 
United States are real. 
                                                 
26 Morris, “The Military,” 92–93.  
27 William Ruger, “Civilian Means of Control,” in Inside Defense: Understanding the U.S. Military in 
the 21st Century, ed. Derek S. Reveron and Judith Hicks Stiehm (New York: St. Martin’s, 2008), 184; 
Hobart B. Pillsbury, Jr. “Raising the Armed Forces,” in National Security and the U.S. Constitution: The 
Impact of the Political System, ed. George C. Edwards III and Wallace Earl Walker (Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1988), 89. 
28 Paul Gronke and Peter D. Feaver, “Uncertain Confidence,” in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-
Military Gap And American National Security, ed. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2001), 161.  
29 Russel F. Weigley, “The American Civil-Military Cultural Gap: A Historical Perspective, Colonial 
Times to the Present,” in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap And American National Security, 
ed. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 243. 
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Parallel to what Gronke and Feaver said about civil-military relations in United 
States, Elliot A. Cohen’s view is that the U.S. military has certain expectations of the 
civilian leadership.  
Those are, above all, that political leaders must immerse themselves in the 
conduct of war no less than they do in great projects of domestic 
legislation; that they master their military briefs as thoroughly as they do 
their civilian ones; that they must demand and expect from their military 
subordinates a candor as bruising as it is necessary; that both groups must 
expect a running conversation in which, although civilian opinion will not 
dictate, it must dominate; that that conversation will include not only ends 
and policies, but ways and means.30 
In this view, because the U.S. defense sector has influence throughout the world, 
U.S. politicians not only need to know what they are doing in determining defense policy, 
but also realize the global impacts of their decisions. In addition, U.S. politicians should 
also consider the impact of defense policy on the society and the people working for 
defense sectors.  
Given these different perspectives, Peter Feaver and Richard A. Kohn suggest 
three changes that need to be done to gradually reform United States civil-military 
relations: “increase military presence in civilian society, improve civilian understanding 
of military affairs, and strengthen civil-military instruction in professional military 
education.”31  
These changes, according to Andrew Bacevich and Richard Kohn, have not yet 
happened. They argue that the military’s preference for massive forces in any U.S. 
involvement in war is an indication of military involvement in civilian political 
decisions.32 Kohn elaborated on this phenomenon in arguing that,  
                                                 
30 Eliot A. Cohen, “The Unequal Dialogue: The Theory and Reality of Civil-Military Relations and 
the Use of Force,” in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security ed. 
Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 458.  
31 Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, “Conclusion: The Gap and What It Means for American 
National Security,” in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, ed. 
Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 469.  
32 Andrew Bacevich and Richard Kohn, “Grand Army of the Republicans,” The New Republic 213, 
no. 23 (December 8, 1997), 22–25.  
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The U.S. military had become more alienated from its civilian leadership 
than at anytime in American history; there was a growing gap between 
U.S. military as an institution and civilian society at large; the U.S. 
military had become politicized and partisan; the U.S. military had 
become resistant to civilian oversight, as illustrated by the efforts to 
dictate when and under what circumstances it would be used to implement 
U.S. policy; officers had come to believe that they had the right to 
confront and resist civilian policy makers, to insist that civilian authorities 
heed their recommendations; and the U.S. military was becoming too 
influential in inappropriate areas of American Society.33  
These facts, according to Owens, have led the U.S. military to become a 
semiautonomous institution that distances itself from the society it is supposed to serve 
and to which it should be accountable.34 The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) as a 
bureaucratic institution also was not without controversy. James G. Burton says:  
During the 1980s, the American public gave the Pentagon not only an 
unprecedented amount of money, but also its trust that the military would 
spend the money wisely for a strong national defense … by that time, I 
had been a witness to the moral and ethical corruption that was so 
commonplace at the senior level of both the military and civilian 
leadership.35 
Burton gave some examples about the Pentagon’s procurement process: “the almost daily 
revelation of horror stories about $600 toilet seats and $400 hammers, a steady stream of 
                                                 
33 Richard H. Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today” 
Naval War College Review 55, no.3 (2002), 54–59, https://usnwc.edu/getattachment/c280d26a-9d66-466a-
809b-e0804cbc05f4/erosion-of-civilian-control-of-the-military-in-the.aspx; Richard H. Kohn, “Out of 
Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” National Interest, no. 35 (Spring 1994), 15–16; See also, 
Russell Weigley, “The American Military and the Principal of Civilian Control from McClelland to 
Powell,” Journal of Military History 57, no.5 (October 1993), 27, doi: 10.2307/2951800; Edward N. 
Luttwak, “Washington’s Biggest Scandal,” Commentary 97, no. 5 (May 1994), 29, 
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/washingtons-biggest-scandal/; Charles J. Dunlap Jr., “The 
Origins of the Coup of 2012,” Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly 22, no. 4 (January 1992), 2, 
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2010winter/Dunlap_Jr.pdf; Charles J. 
Dunlap Jr., “Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military,” Wake Forest Law 
Review 29. No.2 (Summer 1994), 392, 
scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5204&context=faculty_scholarship; Gregory D. 
Foster, “Confronting the Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” The Washington Quarterly, 20, no. 4, (Autumn 
1997), 31–33, doi:10.1080/01636609709550275; and Ole Holsti, “Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes 
and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the Starts of a New Millennium,” in Soldiers and Civilians: 
The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, ed. Peter Feaver and Richard H. Kohn 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 95–99,  
34 Mackubin Thomas Owens, U.S. Civil-Military Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-
Military Bargain (London: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), 4.  
35 James G. Burton Jr., The Pentagon Wars (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 7–8.  
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weapons systems either inadequately tested or purchased regardless of poor test 
results.”36 Such mismanagement has prompted calls for greater military accountability to 
democratically elected leaders.  
Thomas Bruneau and Cristina Matei argue, along with many proponents of U.S. 
defense reform, that “while democratic civilian control is not the issue in the United 
States … the effectiveness of the security sector is recognized to be problematic by 
virtually all policy experts.”37 Bruneau and Matei offer a conceptualization of civilian 
control over the military in terms of civilian authority over institutional control 
mechanisms, oversight, and the inculcation of professional norms; and the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the security forces itself under the control of a democratic 
government.38 Bruneau’s and Matei’s conception not only provides a rigorous theoretical 
basis, but it also serves as a practical basis for examining the subject of civil-military 
relations reform. Proponents of defense reform include scholars, retired military officers, 
and civilian elites who consistently criticize the United States defense community in the 
hope that it will change for the better.39 David C. Hendrikson argues, “The critique of the 
military reformers centers on alleged deficiencies in doctrine, organization, force 
structure, manpower policy, and weapons acquisition.”40 
These problems generated calls for reform. The two most recent defense reform 
policies are the Goldwater-Nichols Reform Act of 1986 and the Intelligence Reform Act 
of 2004. The study of these two policies will be significant in seeing what has changed in 
how the military and civilians in the United States manage their differences. 
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2. Reform of the Security Sector in Democracies 
Defense reform can be viewed from different perspectives. Each nation-state with 
different security and strategic problems derived from geographical position, resources 
constraint, and possibility of conflicts, has its own way and purpose to reform its defense 
apparatus. The United States, which Samuel Finer categorizes as having a mature 
political culture, military interventions into civil society and civilian leadership are 
almost impossible.41 Thus, defense reform does not have the risk of overt or armed 
military disagreement.  
 To support the ongoing process of defense reform in a democracy, Timothy 
Edmunds argues that, “Security sector reform at the political level addresses issues 
associated with the governance of security, and specifically the security sector.”42 
Moreover, the politicians engaging, in security sector reform, need to focus on:  
The establishment and consolidation of mechanisms for civilian and 
democratic control over the security sector, including issues of oversights, 
transparency, and accountability … [this] incorporates not just the 
instruments of security—the army, police, intelligence agencies, and so 
on—but also the wider institutional complex in which they sit, including 
the bureaucracies through which they are administered, the legislative 
framework through which they are regulated, and the mechanism through 
which they are overseen and held accountable.43  
Mark Sedra offers four standards of reform for a civilian-controlled security sector: (1) 
development of a clear and effective institutional framework for providing integrated 
security policy that includes all the actors and focusing on the vulnerable, (2) increased 
civilian governance and oversight of security institutions, (3) development of capable and 
professional security instruments accountable to civil authorities and exposed to civil 
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society, and (4) sustainable delivery of justice and security services.44 These four 
standards capture the general problems that military and civilian leaders struggle to 
resolve in security institutions. 
3. Defense Reform Effectiveness
According to Bruneau, when looking at defense reform in the United States, the 
purpose must not be in finding the problems in democratic civilian control, but in the 
effectiveness of the armed forces governed by the civilian authority.45 Edward N. 
Luttwak agrees, stating, “It is not the efficiency of those forces that is being questioned, 
but rather their military effectiveness under the present strategic circumstances.”46 As 
noted earlier, those advocating security reform in the United States, focus on: doctrine, 
especially the U.S. emphasis on an attrition style warfare; weapons traditionally procured 
by the services that do not work in combat and are expensive to maintain; operational 
concepts that are favored by the services that are badly mistaken; and personnel policies 
of the services that reflect internal convenience rather than strategic need.47    
Deborah Avant offers another view regarding the relation between civil-military 
relations in strong democratic nation-states and military effectiveness. Avant argues that:  
The rules within which political contenders compete for leadership and 
delegate tasks to military organizations affect the strategies that politicians 
employ to affect military behavior and also, over time, the professional 
strength of military organizations and their preferences as embodied in 
organizational culture or bias.48   
Narrow political motivations from civilian political elites, in addition to the particular 
institutions that establish the ground rules of U.S. political competition and civilian 
44 Mark Sedra, The Future of Security Reform, (Waterloo, ONT: CIGI, 2010). 35–6; OECD/DAC 
Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, (2007), available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf, 21.   
45 Ibid., 3. 
46 Edward N. Luttwak, “Effectiveness or Mere Efficiency: Some Reflections,” in Critical Issues: 
Reforming the Military, ed. Jeffrey G. Barlow (The Heritage Foundation, 1981), 2. 
47 Hendrickson, Reforming Defense, 1–2. 
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United Kingdom,” in Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness, ed. Risa A. Brooks 
and Elizabeth A. Stanley (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 80.  
14 
leaders’ interactions with the military, affect military effectiveness. Moreover, Avant 
adds: “U.S. institutions foster military organizations that emphasize skill and quality … 
the United States risks spending too much and generating skills and doctrine not well 
suited to some strategic goals.”49 Avant suggests that the political institutional setting in 
the United States shifts military missions from protecting the nation to serving 
politicians’ political ambitions and make the military ineffective in national defense.  
Retired Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski has emphasized the need for an 
ongoing process of defense reform. “First and foremost,” he argues, “transformation is a 
continuing process. It does not have an end point. Transformation anticipates and creates 
the future and deals with the co-evolution of concepts, processes, organizations, and 
technology.”50 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 This thesis evaluates the motivations for defense reform and their effectiveness 
through two case studies of defense reform in the United States. The thesis 
examines the backgrounds, process, implementation, and impact of the two most recent 
defense reform policies in the United States: the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 2004 to contribute to the 
discussion of civil-military relations and the effectiveness of the defense reforms in 
protecting the nation. This thesis treats the two defense policies as case studies to 
find out why the reforms were enacted, how they may have affected civilian control 
over the security sector and security effectiveness. This thesis examines official 
government documents, regulations and laws, public documents, scholarship, and other 
reputable sources in its analysis. 
49 Avant, “Political Institutions and Military Effectiveness,” 80. 
50 Arthur K. Cebrowski, Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, (Washington, DC: Office of 
Force Transformation, The Pentagon, 2003), 8.  
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II. THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986 
The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act is widely regarded as “the Senate Armed 
Services Committee’s most important legislative achievement during its first fifty years 
of operation.”51 Sen. Sam Nunn stated that “passing the Goldwater-Nichols Act was one 
of the Congress’ finest hours in recent memory.”52 Such testimony of a senior 
congressman marks the significance of the act. Not only that, his testimony suggests that 
there was more than one thing wrong in the DOD that needed to be changed.  
 The effectiveness of the United States military prior to 1986 was in question 
when a series of military failures caused by fierce inter service rivalry that has been going 
since World War II.53 Consequently, defense sector effectiveness from civilian and 
military leaderships went awry. Narrow interests got in the way of civilian and military 
leaders in creating a more effective armed forces. Sharp interservice rivalries and military 
officials seeking political support in the legislature and executive branch surrounding the 
process to create an effective military institution made the military ineffective at its job.  
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 shows that achieving military effectiveness 
requires a heavy and sustained push from lawmakers. National security interests 
overcame, to large extent, parochial interests of political and military leaders. The 
lawmakers displayed the power of democracy over the most powerful military in the 
world in this particular law. Impacts of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 resonate 
throughout the whole world, as even the strongest military on earth must abide by the 
power of democracy.  
Although democratic civilian control is not a major issue in the United States, 
civil-military relations can still be contentions. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 
exemplifies how congressional power can dictate the reform of defense institutions. Yet, 
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the enactment process of the Goldwater-Nichols Act also displayed how the military tried 
to persuade the civilians to reach a decision in its favor.54 The decision of Congress to 
enact the act despite efforts of the military to manipulate divisions among civilian 
authorities to block, demonstrates the strength of democracy in furthering national, rather 
than narrow, interests. 
Civilians and military have different ways of looking at each other. The military 
has special expertise that most civilians hardly understand as non-practitioners. Civilians 
look at the military as an entity of the government, and subject to civilian control. The 
military undervalues the opinions of non-practitioner civilians in terms of military 
operational and organizational concerns. These differences can create not only tensions, 
but military ineffectiveness.  
This chapter will investigate the cause, process, result, and implementation of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The cause section covers military ineffectiveness, which 
led to several military failures. The process section investigates the disagreement between 
those who agreed and disagreed with military reform. The results section discusses the 
passage’s impact, and lastly, the implementation section will discuss how the passage 
changed the military as a defense institution. 
A. CAUSES OF REFORM: MILITARY INEFFECTIVENESS AND 
INEFFICIENCY 
After several operational failures by United States Armed Forces ranging from the 
Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 to the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983, Congress gave 
serious thought to reforming the United States defense institutions.55 Two factors 
prompted calls for reform of the military that ultimately led to the passage of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act. First, U.S. military adventures around the world during the Cold 
War had worried civilians about military effectiveness, in large measure due to fierce 
inter-service rivalries. Several high profile events, depicted in Figure 1, caused 
lawmakers concern over the U.S. military’s ability to meet its missions: the Vietnam 
                                                 
54 Deborah Avant, “Conflicting Indicators of ‘Crisis’ in American Civil-Military Relations,” Armed 
Forces & Society 24, no. 3, Spring 1998, doi: 10.1177/0095327X9802400303, 375–8.  
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War, the Beirut bombings, the Grenada invasion, and the Iranian hostage rescue attempt, 
code-named operation Eagle Claw. Second, and related, mismanagement of the Pentagon 
budget and budgetary turf wars among the services caused concerns about whether the 
Department of Defense and the Services were reliable guardians and efficient spenders of 
taxpayer dollars. Despite these failings that suggested that the Department of Defense 
needed change, several strongholds against the reform appeared in the White House, the 
office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Services, including the Marines Corps.56 The 
battle of ideas, lobbies, political will, and values of the military and civilians lasted for 
almost four years. This section will deal with these failings turn. 
Figure 1.  Military Failures Leading to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986  
 
 
Adapted from Charles Nemfakos et al., The Perfect Storm: The Goldwater-Nichols Act and its Effect on 
Navy Acquisition (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 6. 
1. Vietnam War 
The war in Vietnam left uneasiness in the minds of political elites about the U.S. 
Armed Forces’ effectiveness. Much of this unease arose from their recognition of 
unhealthy inter-service rivalry that impeded military effectiveness and efficiency. Ian 
Hardwood argues that rivalry between the services during the Vietnam War was closely 
related to competition over greater budget resources.57 Each of the services wanted to 
                                                 
56 Bruneau, Patriots for Profit, 85. Based on Thomas Bruneau interview with Arch Barret in Austin, 
Texas, December 8 and 9, 2008. 
57 Ian Hardwood, Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 
Combat Studies Institute Press), 2.  




Grenada Invasion Goldwater-Nichols 
Act of 1986 





develop and purchase its own air power ability. While Hardwood notes that the United 
States Air Force successfully settled a dispute about air power assets between the Army 
and the Navy, each service and the Air Force continue to have air assets.58 
The disastrous outcome of the Vietnam War created dissatisfaction with the U.S. 
representatives in Congress.59 Congressional concerns regarding the military included: 
unclear objectives, failure to counter insurgency, incorrect assessment of North 
Vietnamese fighting capabilities, lack of leadership inside the military, and 
ineffectiveness due to the parochial culture of the military.60 Service rivalries added to 
operational failures in Vietnam to demonstrate the inabilities of the United States fighting 
forces to fight and win. Civilians, largely in the Congress, viewed the military as an 
ineffective institution; hence, they sought to fix it.   
2. Iranian Hostage Rescue Operation 
Operation Eagle Claw became a bitter lesson of failure for the United States 
Armed Forces. The operation was meant to rescue the U.S. hostages held in Iran. The 
operation was extremely complex and highly risky, involving coordinating among three 
commanders and the joint commander two separate sets of aircraft and ground forces at 
two staging areas within Iran without detection and a ground assault on the U.S. 
Embassy. The incident became famous as an example of the failures that arose from each 
service seeking a “piece of the action.” The operation, instead of rescuing fifty-three 
American hostages in Iran, resulted in the fatalities of eight operatives, the destruction of 
a C-130 airplane and a RH-53Ds helicopter, and serious injury to several more 
operatives.61 Commanders on the ground aborted the mission when only five of eight 
helicopters were able to make it to the staging area. As Charles Kamps writes,  
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The brave men who attempted to rescue American hostages in Iran in 
April of 1980 unfortunately became a disastrous reminder of the need for 
unity of command, joint training, and good communications, and the 
dangers of overly complex and needlessly compartmented planning. The 
failure of their mission, Operation Eagle Claw, would be a prime 
motivator in the subsequent formation of U.S. Special Operations 
Command.62 
Losing the lives of the dedicated and courageous personnel led the United States to 
realize the loss of international prestige, and the pride and the confidence of its people in 
the Armed Forces.63  
The failure of the mission raised many questions, particularly: Why did the 
mission fail?64 To answer this, six well-known retired and active-duty generals and flag 
officers were appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to analyze the mission and to produce 
a report of the failures and recommendations.65 Former Chief of Naval Operations 
General James L. Holloway led this distinguished Special Operations Review Group. The 
panel’s summary of the mission command and control stated, “Command and control was 
excellent at the upper echelons, but became more tenuous and fragile at intermediate 
levels. Command relationships below the commander, Joint Task Force, were not clearly 
emphasized in some cases and were susceptible to misunderstanding under pressure.”66 
Two great flaws were identified: too much concern over operational security led to 
compartmentalization of information and an ad hoc approach to the organization of 
command and control and operational planning. In particular, two, rather than one, 
commanders were assigned for the two separate airwings.67 In sum, the United States 
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military was ineffective in using its mammoth resources to maximize the likelihood of 
achieving results. The lack of jointness due to interservice parochialism jeopardized the 
mission. Instead of saving the hostages, the mission resulted in chaotic displays of 
interservice cooperation.  
3. Beirut Bombing 
The Beirut bombing happened in the heat of the discussion of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act. This tragedy occurred on October 23, 1983 when a bomb exploded in the 
headquarters of the Marine Corps Landing Battalion in Beirut, Lebanon. The explosion 
killed and wounded several hundred marines, sailors, and soldiers.68 The large-scale hit 
shocked the United States as a whole. President Ronald Reagan immediately formed a 
commission led by retired Admiral Robert L.J. Long to investigate the unfortunate 
event.69 The Commission found that the military, especially its leadership, was not ready 
to encounter a complex mission environment such as in Beirut.70 Another military 
disaster became the reason for the civilians, in this case the Congress, to be highly 
concerned about the performance of the nation’s military. 
4. Grenada Invasion 
The United States claimed the invasion of Grenada as a successful military 
campaign. In Mark Adkin’s words, nonetheless, the war was a “sledgehammer” against a 
“nutmeg” war, which meant the defense power in Grenada outmatched by United States 
military power.71 Regardless of the political correctness and issues surrounding this war, 
the United States military had proven that they were ineffective in achieving victory 
against a “nutmeg.” The ineffectiveness appeared when four Navy SEALs died on a 
reconnaissance mission after jumping out of an Air Force plane; the Army on the ground 
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could not communicate with the Navy providing fire support on the ships because their 
communication systems were incompatible; the Navy refused to refuel an Army 
helicopter that accidentally landed on their ship; a Marine pilot refused to fly Army 
Rangers using Marine helicopters; a Navy airstrike hit an Army unit and wounded sixteen 
Army Rangers and killed one.72 The lack of cooperation and coordination between 
services were worrisome.  
 Again, the same problems of inter-service interoperability from the latest failures 
arose as follows: an inadequate communication system, a lack of leadership, and poor 
planning.73 The repeated mistakes made the civilians, in this case the Congress, conclude 
that the military needed a serious push to reform itself. 
5. Pentagon Mismanagement  
The second defense issue that became a concern for lawmakers was budget 
management in the Pentagon. Although this thesis does not focus on budget management, 
such mismanagement by the United States Department of Defense must be mentioned. 
Zegart argues that the reports regarding the defense budget during the period of attempted 
reformation under Reagan administration were devastating.74 For example, the Pentagon 
paid $110 for $0.04 diode, and the Pentagon wasted $9,000 for an ordinary wrench.75  
Mismanagement in the Pentagon also worried some top administration officials. 
David A. Stockman, the director of the Office of Management and Budget under 
President Reagan, referred to the Pentagon as a “swamp” of waste and “contracting 
idiocy,” that wasted around thirty billion dollars per year of tax-payer money.76 Fixing 
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the Pentagon, in his view, would save at least fifteen billion dollars per year.77 Military 
failures, mostly due to lack of jointness, combined with bad management in spending in 
the Pentagon became two of many serious issues of ineffectiveness that concentrated 
lawmakers’ attention on United States security matters. The military as the expert in 
violence lost its legitimacy when the effectiveness of the military in all of the operations 
mentioned above proved to be the contrary. The mismanagement of the budget put an 
extra weight on military effectiveness as well. Hence, these two causes of ineffectiveness 
created pressure for reform of the defense agencies. 
After these series of operational failures and findings of mismanagement, the 
military and Congress began the “battle” to reform the United States military.78 The use 
of the word battle for the Congress to reform the military institution in a democratic 
nation, in which the military is fully responsible to civilian rulers, is remarkable. 
Congress encountered stiff resistance from the Presidential administration, supported by 
most of active high-ranking generals. Tension among the civilian leadership and 
resistance from parts of the military made the discussion over whether pass the law 
politically heated. According to Locher, it was a battle worth fighting.79 
B. PROCESS 
Proponents of reform within the military initiated the process of the enacting the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act. Senator Nunn states that the efforts to reform the Department of 
Defense started with the testimony of U.S. Air Force General David Jones in his appeal to 
the House of Armed Service Committee for reform of the joint system.80 On February 3, 
1982, General David Jones, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), turned a 
scheduled “usual” testimony about the DOD initial budget in front of the House of 
Armed Services Committee (HASC) into a personal confession about how badly the 
United States military needed to be reformed, especially the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) 
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functions.81 The Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was uncomfortable with Jones’s 
unscheduled mission to reform the defense sector.82 A month later, the administration 
announced Jones’s replacement for his job.83 Nevertheless, the process of the United 
States defense reform was started. Later on, in the heat of the enactment, all active duty 
generals supported the administration’s side in disagreeing with the proposed law. 
The military reformation driven by Congress faced strong challenges from the 
administration. Not only did many in the military resist reform, but also the civilians 
leading the military rejected it, including the President and the Secretary of Defense.84 It 
is unsurprising that loyal military leaders would support their civilian leaders, especially 
the one that appointed them. Military reluctance to support reform may also have 
increased after General Jones’ dismissal. The military leadership joined their civilian 
authorities’ position in challenging the reform at different levels of agreement, or 
disagreement.85 Some of the generals that agreed about the need to reform the military, 
like Generals Jones and Meyer, but it was not their place to differ from the administration 
or the Commander in Chief. General Jones and Meyer had nothing to lose, given that they 
were at the end of their careers. Even though they got fired, they had already attained the 
highest military possible rank in the United States.  
The reform did not happen easily. The term “battle” used by one of the influential 
actors in the reformation process was not an exaggeration of it. It took almost four years 
and the military failures in Beirut and Grenada that cost the lives of American soldiers to 
get the reform moving. Notably, this effort happened in an era when the President 
proposed increasing the budget for the defense sector.86 Since military effectiveness 
became an issue in Congress, the proposed increased budget was at stake.87 The 
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effectiveness of the military was a lower priority for the administration, than its 
budgetary priorities.  
General Jones went all out for reforming the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
In 1981, he built a Chairman’s special study group to investigate the reform possibility of 
the JCS.88 General Jones personally made sure that the result would be free from the 
influences of the services.89 Not only that, General Jones released a publication about the 
defection in the military top brass organization without consulting the other chiefs or the 
Secretary of Defense.90 He published an article, “Why The Joint Chiefs of Staff Must 
Change,” in the March 1982 edition of Armed Forces Journal International.91 General 
Jones criticized the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which he led, by addressing the fierce 
service parochialism inside in the organization and the unpreparedness of all the 
personnel who served in the JCS, including the leadership.92 General Jones proposed 
change in three areas: “strengthen the role of the chairman; limit service staff 
involvement in the joint process; and broaden the training, experience, and rewards for 
joint duty.”93 Military effectiveness eventually became a big issue in Washington with 
General Jones’ moves to push reform in the military organization.  
The Army Chief of Staff, General Edward Meyer, also supported General Jones’ 
crusade, even though they had different approaches and opinions about the problem. 
General Meyer published an article supporting reform in the same journal as General 
Jones, almost at the same time.94 He proposed changing the decision-making process in 
regards to nuclear and conventional warfare, ending the acute parochialism in the 
military, and replacing the JCS with what he called the National Military Advisory 
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Council.95 Meyer suggested a new set of organizations to replace the JCS, which was 
unlikely to happen. Nonetheless, these two generals demonstrated bravery in admitting 
their organization’s defects, even though it was at the end of their military careers, after 
they had reached the peak of the military they were criticizing.   
These two notable generals were supported by pro-military reform Congressmen; 
finally, with the help of “the political stars that aligned in the right place,”96 the 
Congressmen took the lead in the effort of reform. When General Jones testified on the 
need for reform in the Congress, his testimony captivated one of the HASC staffers, 
Archie D. Barrett.97 The HASC members originally resisted hearing Jones’ testimony, 
but Barrett persuaded the HASC to start the new bill to reform the defense 
organization.98 Representative Richard White (D-Texas), Barrett’s boss, followed up on 
his advice and introduced a “modest” bill coded H.R. 6954 to the House floor without 
widespread support, but enough to pass the house.99  
After passing the House, Senator John Tower (R-Texas), persuaded by Rep. 
White and Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia), reluctantly introduced the bill to the Senate 
floor at the end of 1982, when the Congress was ready for recess.100 He was hoping that 
H.R. 6954 would escape the floor’s attention, since Tower was a Republican, and a 
Republican held the White House. H.R. 6954 did not pass the Senate because it was too 
“modest” for a reform, and the testimony from the defense secretary and the services 
chiefs convinced the Senate Armed Service Committee (SASC) that the bill was not 
worth being passed.101 Even Jones, the general who started the reorganization movement, 
was against it.102 The difference among the supporters of the reorganization was that the 
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bill would not really change anything, and the non-supporters challenged anything related 
to reform.  
Representative Bill Nichols (D-Alabama) assumed the chairman position of the 
Investigations Subcommittee of the HASC and continued White’s legacy in supporting 
the defense reorganization bill. At first, Nichols was reluctant to fight for this issue 
because he thought this idea originally belonged to White.103 Nonetheless, the HASC 
staffer, Barrett, advised Nichols to put the reorganization on his agenda and Nichols 
agreed.104 During Nichols’ new term, positive letters passed between him and Secretary 
Weinberger about the reorganization bill; the administration was preparing its own 
legislative proposal for military reorganization.105 On April 14, 1983, Representative Ike 
Skelton (D-Missouri), initiated an early start for reforming the military without 
consulting Nichols and Weinberger.106 Skelton introduced the Military and Command 
Reorganization Act coded H.R. 2560 based on the suggestion of General Maxwell 
Taylor, which more or less matched General Meyer’s ideas.107 The pro-reformers 
disagreed with General Meyer’s idea because, according to Barrett, they argued it would 
make the JCS worse rather than better.108   
On April 18, 1983, the effort to push the agenda, however, faced a competing 
reorganization bill to the HASC initiated by the Reagan administration, H.R. 3145.109 
This bill mirrored H.R. 6954 that placed the JCS in the chain of command of the 
military.110 This bill would also increase peacetime tours for the members of JCS, and 
erase personnel quotas for JCS’s staffers.111 According to Locher, this bill would not 
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strengthen the JCS position.112 Also, this bill showed that the DOD confused its own 
terms of the chain of command.113 The bill’s actual language suggested that the JCS 
would act as a link and communicator between the Secretary of Defense and the 
Combatant Commanders, which would actually place the JCS outside the chain of 
command.114 Reformers argued that this particular proposed bill was actually only a 
cover-up bill to keep the reorganization inside the Pentagon.115 
The new generals appointed to the JCS testified in a series of hearings at the 
house that they fully supported the administration’s proposed bill, which met with some 
disagreements from the pro reformers, Generals Meyer and Taylor. The HASC agreed to 
H.R. 3145 with some amendments to the bill and gave it a new code H.R. 3718.116 The 
changes to H.R. 3145 made by Nichols and Barrett faced formal challenges from the 
Department of Defense. Nonetheless, the House still passed the bill to the Senate by 
unanimous decision on October 17, 1983.117 The bill’s fate now rested in Tower’s hands 
as the chairman of the SASC.  
Two personal objectives influenced Tower’s willingness to bring up the bill in the 
Senate. He reportedly wanted to be Secretary of Defense and the current Secretary, 
Weinberger, had won the nomination over him previously.118 The bill was a perfect 
political way for Tower to show the White House that it had chosen the wrong secretary 
and should promote him for the position.119 He sought to cautiously undermine 
Weinberger as incapable of the top Pentagon position while maintaining the President’s 
and Republican Party’s legitimacy, at least until after the November 1984 election.120 
The main idea was to make Weinberger look incompetent and the administration look 
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clean.121 Added to his planned role in driving the defense reorganization in the Senate to 
his advantage, Tower would appear as the right person to lead the DOD in the new 
administration, on the assumption that a Republican would occupy the White House after 
the November election.122 Nonetheless, his indecisiveness in the hearings added 
inconsistency to the defense reorganization legislative process in the Senate.123 In 1989, 
President George W. Bush finally nominated him for Secretary of Defense, but the Senate 
rejected his nomination over personality concerns.124 
The legislative process gained momentum with the Beirut bombing, when Tower 
retired from the Senate, and when Pentagon mismanagement of its budget became a 
public issue.125 The Beirut incident pushed the Congressmen who were invested in the 
defense reorganization act to push the bill even harder, especially Congressman 
Nichols.126 The official report of the Beirut incident released by the government, the 
Long Commission Report, blamed the commanders in the field, which more or less ended 
two Marine colonels’ careers.127 President Reagan assumed full responsibility for the 
incident by releasing a statement to the press the night before the official report was 
released.128 He also let the Marine Corps Commandant, General Paul X. Kelley, refuse 
full responsibility in front of the Congressional hearings. The Senate viewed these 
presidential acts as undermining the U.S. military justice system.129 On that account, the 
Congressmen decided to push forward with the military reorganization bill. On January 
1985, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) took over the chair of the Armed Service 
Committee and started the “battle” with the reorganization opponents. Republicans 
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gained the majority in the Senate after the 1984 elections. Soon after, Senator Goldwater 
made the defense reorganization legislation as his top priority.  
Nonetheless, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force, as well as the chairman of the JCS, thought that reorganization of the United States 
military was unnecessary, and if there were anything requiring change, it should be from 
within the DOD.130 Weinberger, as the leader in the resistance against reorganization led 
by Congress, gathered full support from the president.131 Many people argued, civilian 
and military, that Weinberger was not the right man for the job.132 He was looking at the 
reorganization issue as a Congressional effort to cut the defense budget, in opposition to 
the president’s agenda for increasing the budget.133 Instead, to fix the military problems, 
Weinberger argued the Pentagon needed more money.134 Consequently, with all the 
current JCS and service secretaries rallying behind Weinberger, they were actively 
lobbying Goldwater to act in their favor.135 
For the administration, the military reorganization in the form of legislation would 
provide more political risks and less benefit to the administration. At the least, the 
president would have to invest political capital, energy, and time in the reform.136 
Importantly, the reorganization might show deficiencies in the administration, which 
would have a politically negative impact to the administration in the election year.137 The 
risk of losing support from the military by supporting the defense reform was too great 
for the president to take. Moreover, the president would likely lose leverage in achieving 
his political agenda and importantly, GOP electoral chances in the future.138 Hence, in 
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this particular case, even though all the indications showed that President Reagan 
supported the non-reformers, he never publicly announced his position.  
The bureaucrats, civilians, and the military in the Pentagon would also lose great 
power in the reorganization.139 The civilians in the Pentagon would lose control if the 
service rivalries were abolished and the military officials united.140 They would lose the 
chance to point fingers and divide the military when something went wrong.141 Military 
officials would risk their traditional roles in exercising parochialism with an effective 
JCS set up by the reformers.142 Changing the JCS would also risk the arrangements 
between services, especially on the budget, that already were in place.143 These reasons 
motivated the heart of the administration to fight the reorganization legislation in any way 
possible. 
Several political efforts by the anti-reformers stood out on Capitol Hill that 
temporarily led Goldwater to resign as co-chair of the defense reorganization bill task 
force.144 In addition to providing staff studies and dissenting opinions in hearings against 
defense reorganization legislation, his anti-reform Republican colleagues informed him 
that his co-chair in the bill’s task force, Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia), tried to make the 
defense reorganization effort a partisan issue to undermine the president and 
Weinberger.145 Goldwater then stepped down and appointed Senator Phil Gramm (R-
Texas), a known associate of the Secretary of Navy, John Lehman, to take over his 
position in the reorganization task force.146 A Goldwater staffer, James Locher III, 
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convinced Goldwater that the issue was being brought up to demolish the reorganization 
effort, and Goldwater resumed his seat.147 
Another attempt to break up the bipartisan task force was made by one of 
Goldwater’s staff, James McGovern. Goldwater unwittingly signed his own letter of 
resignation from the task force and appointed Gramm again as his replacement without 
his knowledge.148 McGovern asked Goldwater to sign a bundle of insignificant 
administration letters, and Goldwater’s clerk found Gramm’s appointment letter in the 
midst of them.149 Goldwater eventually found out about it, but he did not significantly 
punish his staff. (Later, in September 1986, President Reagan would appoint McGovern 
as the U.S. Under Secretary of the Air Force.) The anti-reformers had tried to do 
everything possible to sabotage the effort of defense reform, but bipartisanship between 
the two majority and minority leaders in the Senate, Goldwater and Nunn, ensured of the 
enactment of the Goldwater-Nichol Act of 1986. 
In May 1984, Tower urged the President’s security adviser, Bud McFarlane, to 
initiate an administration’s study to reorganize the Department of Defense. The purpose 
of the study was to ease congressional concerns about defense issues and persuade the 
Congress to let the administration reorganize the military in its own way.150 When 
Pentagon mismanagement became a serious issue to the public in early 1985, the 
President, with the advice from McFarlane that was not in line with Weinberger’s, 
announced the Packard commission.151 While the media and several Congressmen 
hesitated over the objectivity of this commission and thought it was a public relations 
move from the White House, the SASC under Goldwater already had good relations with 
the commission chairman, David Packard and they reached an understanding to support 
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each other in fixing the Pentagon.152After a huge number of hearings, meetings, and 
heated discussions, the Senate voted for bill S. 2295 with ninety-five votes to none.153 
Soon after, the House passed their reorganization bill by 406 to 4 votes.154 The 
military reorganization in the House’s bill mandated more significant reform than the 
Senate’s bill.155 The House and Senate held a conference to collaborate on both bills, and 
according to Gordon Lederman, it represented the lowest point of congressional-military 
relations in the reorganization process.156 In one of many heated meetings between the 
JCS and HASC, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, called the 
House’s bill “un-American.”157 The services looked at the House bill as too extreme in 
reorganizing the military and strongly objected to the integration of both bills.158 
Regardless, the bipartisan bill named the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 passed Congress in mid-September 1986 and was signed by 
the president at October 1, 1986.159  
C. RESULT 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act, according to the Congress, had eight purposes: 
reforming the Department of Defense and strengthening civilian control over the military, 
enhancing military advice to civilians, creating a clear responsibility of the Combatant 
Commanders (CCDR) to execute their missions, strengthening CCDR’s authority over 
the soldiers at their disposal, expanding a focus on strategy and contingency planning, 
motivating efficient use of defense resources, improving officer management to enhance 
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their capability in an inter service operation, and improving effectiveness in military 
operations and DOD management in a joint armed forces.160 The Act divided those eight 
purposes into six titles. 
Title I focused on the Secretary of Defense office’s role in improving the DOD’s 
budget management. The title enhances civilian roles in reviewing and observing 
contingency plans’ quality, made by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 
and situating the plans in line with the defense policy.161 The Under Secretary of Defense 
for policy holds the responsibility to assist the Secretary of Defense in this role.162 The 
requirements to support the function are providing written annual guidance for DOD 
components in preparing the budget proposal, and annual guidance for the CJCS to 
review contingency plans.163 Furthermore, this title specifies that the Secretary of 
Defense must assist the President in appointing DOD officials to ensure that the 
appointee has expertise in defense policy.164 
Title II paid particular attention to the JCS and CINC. Commander in Chief 
(CINC) leads Geographical Command and Functional Command as Geographical 
Combatant Commander (GCC) and Functional Combatant Commander. Geographical 
Command currently consists of African Command, Central Command, European 
Command, Northern Command, Pacific Command, and Southern Command. Functional 
Command consisted of Special Operation Command (USSOCOM), Strategic Command 
(USSTRATCOM), and Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). The CJCS would 
serve the President over a two-year time frame and can serve for two terms.165 Although 
the Act designates the CJCS as the highest military rank in the Armed Forces, the CJCS 
has no military authority over the JCS or “any of the Armed Forces.”166 Title II dictates 
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the role of the CJCS as the main adviser, and the service chiefs as auxiliary advisors on 
military matters, to the civilian leaders: president, the National Security Council, and the 
Secretary of Defense.167 In advising, the CJCS may consult the service chiefs and CINC 
when necessary.168 Also, to ensure the chiefs’ voices are accountable, the title dictated 
that the JCS meet regularly.169 The CJCS would have the freedom to state his personal 
opinion and become the channel of dissent from service chiefs to the civilian leaders.170 
Title II Section 153 described the CJCS functions as follows: 
• The CJCS provides assistance to the president and the Secretary of 
Defense in military strategy. 
• The CJCS prepares a strategic plan with respect to the resources allocated 
by the Secretary of Defense. 
• The CJCS prepares, reviews, evaluates, and ensures a contingency plan in 
line with the scope of Department of Defense policy guidance. 
• The CJCS has to advise the Secretary of Defense in the matter of budget 
priorities with respect to CCDRs budget requirements and in line with the 
services’ budgets under the strategic plans. Also, the CJCS has to prepare 
“alternative program recommendations and budget proposals, within 
projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary of 
Defense.” 
• The CJCS produces joint doctrine and policies for military education and 
training. 
• The CJCS appoints an officer to represent the United States Armed Forces 
in the United Nations Military Staff Committee. 
• The CJCS prepares reports about the military’s dissection of roles and 
missions every three years and CINC missions, responsibilities, and 
boundaries every two years.171 
The position and roles of the JCS vice chairman are stated in section 154 Title II. 
The vice chairman holds the second highest rank in the United States military, but like 
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the CJCS, the vice chairman has no authority over any other member of the JCS or 
military forces.172 The vice chairman should be an officer from a different service than 
the CJCS and have served in several joint posts.173 The duties of the vice-chairman are 
not dictated by law; rather they rely on the CJCS and the Secretary of Defense for 
definition.174 The section dictates that the vice chairman would act as the chairman’s 
replacement and votes only in the absence of the CJCS.175 
Title II section 155 rules are about the JCS staff. The staffers are to be sourced 
from the suggestions from the service secretaries of the best officers in the services and 
selected by the chairman.176 The selected staff numbers, limited to 1,627, should be 
equally shared among the Army, the combination of the Navy and the Marines; and the 
Air Force.177 The selected staffers are directly under the “authority, direction, and 
control” of the chairman.178 The Staff may only serve for four years as CJS staffers, and 
they may serve again after two years outside of the JCS staff formation.179 
The most sweeping piece of the law is in Title II, sections 162 to 164. These 
sections change the entire United States military organization and cover the movement of 
personnel and unit authority from the services to the CINCs. The law dictated that all 
United States military should serve under the CINCs. All personnel who serve in specific 
geographical areas should report to the GCC, unless the military personnel are needed by 
the services to support their functions in training and equipping.180 Also, transfer of units 
between CINCs needs authorization from the Secretary of Defense.181 
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The line of command as dictated in section 163 runs from president to Secretary 
of Defense to CINCs; however, the president could order the CJCS to convey CINCs’ 
reports to civilian leaders.182 Nonetheless, although the CJCS may perform such a 
function, the CJCS still has no authority over any military forces.183 The president and 
Secretary of Defense may alter the CINCs’ authorities; the Act prescribes seven 
authorities to CINCs, as follows: 
• The CINCs have the authority over subordinate commands, forces, 
missions, joint training, and logistics necessary to achieve a mission 
tasked to the commands. 
• The CINCs have the authority to stipulate the chain of command in the 
respective subordinate commands and forces. 
• The CINCs have the authority to organize respective commands in respect 
to the mission at hands. 
• The CINCs have the authority to employ forces necessary to accomplish 
the command’s missions. 
• The CINCs have the authority to designate command roles to lower 
commanders. 
• The CINCs have the authority to arrange administration, support, and 
discipline necessary in the aspects of resources, equipment, training, and 
organization to achieve optimal results for the missions tasked to the 
commands. 
• The CINCs have the authority to appoint subordinate commanders and 
CINCs’ staff, including imposing rules over his command such as 
suspension and the call for martial courts.184 
This title significantly removes the services’ authority over the CINCs. The law 
dictates that the “component commanders”185 under the CINCs are to report to their 
CINCs every communication between them and the rest of the DOD.186 Nevertheless, the 
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appointment of the component commanders is not vested in the CINCs alone; the 
appointment is vested in the services, but the CINCs have the power to disagree with the 
services.187 Importantly, the CINCs may submit budget proposals for contingencies, joint 
exercises, training, and particular missions to the Secretary of Defense without consulting 
the services.188  
Title III of the Act focuses on limiting the agencies and DOD field activity that 
supports DOD in supply and service.189 The passage allows either the CJCS or a civilian 
officer appointed by the office of the Secretary of Defense to oversee the agencies and 
provide opinions about their budget proposals and readiness.190 The CJCS also has the 
responsibility to evaluate the performance of the agencies in conducting joint training.191 
To halt the agencies and field activity growth, the Act limits personnel from serving in 
both.192 
Title IV dictates that the military is to enhance joint capabilities by preparing the 
management of officers’ needed capabilities, including education, occupation, and 
promotion requirements for military personnel toward a joint military. In support of the 
Act becoming reality, the Act dictates that the Secretary of Defense create a specialty in 
the military called “joint specialty,” which requires joint specialty officers to complete 
joint professional military education and, at the least, have served once in a joint duty 
post.193 The Secretary of Defense is mandated by the Act to oversee the joint education 
program to maintain the quality of joint education.194  
In regards to joint occupation and promotion, the DOD is required to provide a 
thousand posts for joint duty assignments, and half of these must be filled by a joint 
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specialty officer of the rank of Captain/Navy Lieutenant or above.195 These two 
significant requirements for the DOD need to be done within two years after the 
enactment of the Act.196 In order to ensure the services will treat the officers in joint duty 
the same as the officers serving in the services, the law dictates similar promotion rates 
between the officers serving on the joint staff and services’ headquarters, officers with 
joint specialty capability and officers serving in services’ headquarters, as well as officers 
without joint specialty serving in joint assignments and officers in the respective 
services.197 Also, occupation in their own service does not count as a joint assignment for 
the military officers.198  
With respect to promotion, the Act demands a promotion board give credit to 
officers who have served and are serving in joint posts.199 In order to ensure that the 
military officers have adequate knowledge and preparation to create a joint military 
environment, the Act requires newly appointed flag-rank officers to participate in an 
education program designed for a joint military purpose.200 To acquire a higher rank, vice 
admiral/lieutenant general or above, an officer should have had positive evaluations from 
the CJCS in joint assignments.201 
Title V of the Act focuses on all military departments. The functions of the 
military departments cover recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, and training.202 
These functions are primarily designed to satisfy the needs of the Unified Combatant 
Command and Geographical Combatant Command.203 The Act dictates that the officers 
serving as chiefs of staff serve in at least one joint duty post in the flag-rank and have 
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extensive knowledge of joint duty.204 The Act also mandates the military services to 
reduce and set up limits on the number of flag-rank officers working in service 
headquarters.205 Organizationally, the Act dictates that the service secretaries inspect the 
collaborative function of the secretaries’ staff and military department headquarter staff 
in order to avoid duplication.206 The secretaries are responsible for functions including 
acquisitions, auditing, comptroller, inspector general, legislative affairs, and public 
affairs.207 
Title VI covers reports and numbers of staff in the lower level headquarters. The 
title dictates that the president submits an annual report about the national security 
strategy to Congress, which tailors defense to foreign policy.208 Also, the Secretary of 
Defense should prepare an evaluation about the dynamics between the military’s structure 
and missions in the form of an annual report.209 The Act demands a reduction in lower 
level headquarters including services and commands as well as agencies and field 
activities.210  
The Goldwater-Nichols Act changed the DOD significantly and is one of the most 
important laws in the United States.211 Although the Act did not receive proper 
appreciation outside of Congress,212 it improves three major areas in the United States 
DOD: the JCS, the configuration of the joint staff administration, and the unified 
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commanders’ command and control over their commands.213 These three improvements 
calibrated the DOD into a more balanced organization, including the centralization of the 
Armed Forces, geographic and functional commands; and general specialty of the 
officers.214 The Goldwater-Nichols Act significantly reformed the DOD. The Act, to 
some extent, reduced service parochialism and brought all the services towards more joint 
cooperation, and more importantly, a joint mind set.215 It not only reorganized the chain 
of command in the Department of Defense, but also the development of the defense 
budget flows and priorities in force structures.216  Thus, this Act is considered a model in 
achieving military effectiveness, even though the process reflected the political interests 
among the parties involved.217 
D. IMPLEMENTATION 
The spirit of jointness from the Goldwater-Nichols Act shaped the United States 
Armed Forces into a power that focused on conventional threats.218 The United States 
military operations after the Goldwater-Nichols Act showed positive outcomes, including 
operations in Panama in 1989, the 1991 Gulf War, and Iraq and Afghanistan.219 Locher 
offers an interesting view, saying that the Goldwater-Nichols reform provides two 
lessons: first that defense needs to be improved innovatively and continuously, and 
second, that officers in the Armed Forces choose loyalty to the service or to the nation’s 
interest.220  
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Evaluating the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act sheds light on how 
the military executes what the law has dictated and how willingly they abide by that law. 
The implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act has not been perfect. Douglas 
Lovelace argues that “the DOD has substantially, but not completely, implemented the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act.”221 In the process of the Act’s enactment, the military had more 
non-reformers and, at the end of the process, rallied behind the Secretary of Defense as an 
anti-reformer who in turn was required to execute the Act out of respect for the rule of 
law. This part of the chapter investigates the three most substantial areas at the core of the 
Act that improved the DOD as a whole—the CJCS, Geographic and Functional 
Commands, and the management of the joint forces—in order to look at the effectiveness 
of the military after the Act.  
The CJCS is the primary military adviser to the president, the Secretary of 
Defense, and the National Security Council. The CJCS’ position in advocating the 
services’ interests and CINCs’ missions placed it in the middle of organizational 
tension.222 The services would have their own interests and the CINCs would advise the 
CJCS with their own needs in accomplishing their mission.223 This situation might easily 
have led to bureaucratic imbalance, as in advising the civilian leaders the CJCS might 
favor one or the other.224 Concerns included the CJCS privileging his/her own service 
when advising the civilian authority.225 According to Robert Previdi, this centralization 
was a “serious mistake.”226 A strong CJCS undermines the effectiveness of military 
advice to the civilian decision makers by only providing a single military voice.227 
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The other problem in implementing a stronger CJCS was its ability to impose 
joint doctrine on the services and, importantly, the resources to execute the task. The 
CJCS’s staff responsible for joint doctrine is the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) 
working under the Director of Operational Plans and Interoperability.228 The main 
objective of the JWFC is to “assist the CJCS, CINCs, and service chiefs in their 
preparation for joint and multinational operations in the conceptualization, development, 
and assessment of current and future joint doctrine and in the accomplishment of joint 
and multinational training and exercises.”229 
In reality, critics argue that the JWFC possesses insufficient funds and resources 
to develop joint doctrine; thus, the CJCS tasks the services to produce the doctrines.230 
The aim of avoiding services that are too strong failed in this area. The other mission of 
the JWFC is making observations and giving recommendations without knowing how the 
recommendations work at the other end.231 Finally, the services have to train their forces 
in joint operations and exercises, but the other user, the CINCs and CINCs’ headquarter 
staff, have not aligned training and exercises on how properly to use those forces.232  
The CINCs acquired more power and responsibility under the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act, which changed the way the United States military projects its power in the world. 
Robert Hein argues, “The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 
of 1986 may have unwittingly tipped the scales toward the use of military power.”233 The 
Goldwater-Nichols Act increased the role of the GCC in an unprecedented way. 
Consequently, commanders of GCCs have more direct influence in military operations 
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and even foreign policy around the world.234 With the military expanding its influence 
even more outside the United States, the nation started to rely on the GCCs for foreign 
missions.235 Moreover, the increasing role of the GCCs in foreign missions may have led 
the United States into more conflicts overseas.236 Favoring a military approach in foreign 
missions may send the wrong message to people around the world, including adversaries, 
allies, and friendly nations. In addition, when the military has a prominent role on 
diplomatic issues, the advice accepted by the policymakers may be military advice.237 
Thus, the decisions made by policy makers would tend to be military solutions. 
The distribution of power between the CINCs and services chiefs also created 
tension among military leaders, resulting in ineffectiveness. The CINCs’ roles in 
budgetary process, through the CJCS, created competition between the CINCs and the 
service chiefs.238 The competition could lead to the ineffectiveness of the CINCs. The 
CINCs, instead of focusing their main mission to win the fight in their respective 
geographical responsibility, would pay more attention to win over the budgets.239 An 
example of the ineffectiveness caused by weak communication between the chiefs and 
CINCs was the 1996 cruise missile attack in one of the U.S. military barracks in the 
Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.240 The official report on this particular case suggested 
that the services chiefs did not fully commit to support the GCC with their best personnel 
available.241 Another example occurred in Gulf War I when the Marine Corps 
Commandant General Al Gray cancelled his third trip to the Theater of Operation 
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because the CINC, General Norman Schwarzkopf, viewed Gray’s frequent visits as 
interfering in the CINC’s business.242 
The management of joint power needs improvement, according to Michael R. 
Gordon and Bernard Trainor. While the Gulf War was widely seen as a huge success of 
the joint forces’ capability, there were some missteps. The assignment of all air assets in 
the Gulf War under the control of the Air Force met some resistance. The Marines defied 
Air Force control over their air assets: the FA-18.243 Also, a lack of synchronized 
communication between the Air Force and the Navy meant that the daily assignments for 
the Navy had to be in written form and airlifted from the Air Force base in Saudi Arabia 
to an aircraft carrier off the coast of Saudi Arabia.244 The joint forces led to positive 
output for the U.S. military’s effectiveness, but also to sharp service rivalries.245 
Arguably, the United States Armed Forces have been making progress over time in 
mitigating service rivalries and moving toward more effective fighting forces. 
E. CONCLUSION  
The Goldwater-Nichols Act was an important capstone for the United States for 
civilian control of the military. Despite great tension between the pro-reformers and non-
reformers, in the end, the military complied, with few exceptions. The exceptions did not 
happen from opposition to civilians exercising control over the military, but because of a 
culture of parochialism had lived inside the military for years. The Goldwater-Nichols 
Act of 1986 was created to increase the effectiveness of the U.S. Armed Forces. Bruneau 
argues, “Virtually all informed observers agree that Goldwater-Nichols substantially 
improved military effectiveness, a fact that has been proven in all of the military 
campaigns between its implementation and the present day.”246 Christopher M. Bourne, 
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however, remains concerned about the unintended strengthening of military commands 
over their civilian superiors:  
While the operational performance of the Armed Forces and the 
bureaucratic efficiency of DOD have improved, some of the law’s 
provisions have overcompensated for the inadequacies of earlier defense 
reorganizations. They invest inordinate authority in a single military 
officer and his staff while reducing the checks and balances within and 
between the executive and legislative branches.247  
It seems clear that bureaucratic efficiency in the DOD and Armed Forces have improved; 
in these two areas, the two experts, Bruneau and Bourne, complement each other. 
Nonetheless, skepticism regarding the Goldwater-Nichols Act’s impact on effectiveness 
and civil military relations persists. Most current significant critic to the Goldwater-
Nichols Act emerges that the Act was designed to organized military structure in the Cold 
War era and needs to be updated to face the current security challenge.248  
The military reform discussed in this chapter showed the dynamics of the civil-
military relations in the United States. Even though the relationship was not a threat to 
democratic civilian control, the tension between civilians and the military at the highest 
level was still great. The generals supported the administration, especially the Secretary 
of Defense, for traditional reasons: service parochialism and established services’ control 
over budgets.249 The generals, regardless of the worrisome number of military failures, 
refused changes in the military. The civilians, represented by the administration leaders, 
the president, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress, in some cases showed that 
parochial political interests were as important for their pro- or anti-position as the purpose 
and nature of the reform itself.  
President Reagan stayed out of the reform “battle” because he did not want to lose 
his political capital in a non-beneficial political situation.250 Defense reform would 
benefit the president, but openly supporting the reform might make his top military 
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leaders non-sympathetic to the administration. The Secretary of Defense spearheaded the 
administration’s efforts in challenging the reform. Allowing the reform would eliminate 
the comfortable the status quo enjoyed by the military and civilian bureaucracies. The 
process of enacting and implementing this Act showed that the military are deeply 
involved in political contests affecting their interests. Thus, parochial political interests 
endangered the purpose of the reform: the creation of a more effective military instrument 
to protect U.S. national security. The reform, however, appears to have achieved its goal 
of improving U.S. military effectiveness. 
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III. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT  
This chapter reviews the 9/11 Commission Report recommendations that 
specifically address the reform of the intelligence community in the United States, 
considering that the intelligence community acts as a part of the defense establishment in 
the civil-military context. These recommendations ultimately became a touchstone for 
U.S. security policy reform to fight global terrorism. While both the intelligence 
institutions and society as a whole have changed significantly since 9/11, this chapter 
shows that the policy and legal reforms directed by the 9/11 Commission Report have not 
made the U.S. intelligence community more effective, but rather less so. If anything, the 
process by which intelligence reform was promoted and ultimately derailed shows how 
politics at the highest level diminished, if not crippled, meaningful intelligence 
community reform. 
In order to closely investigate the intelligence reform in the United States, this 
chapter observes the cause, process, result, and implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
Report in reforming the U.S. intelligence community. The cause section investigates the 
motivation for Congress to enact measures from the 9/11 Commission Report in 
connection with intelligence failures and reforms for the intelligence community. The 
process section investigates the 9/11 Commission Report with a focus on the 
collaboration between the Congress and President George W. Bush’s administration. The 
results section covers the specific recommendations from the 9/11 Commission that 
transformed the American intelligence community, with an emphasis on how these 
recommendations acquired the necessary political support to make intelligence changes 
to protect the nation from the threat of global terrorism and prevent attacks on the United 
States. The implementation section investigates the impact of the 9/11 Commission 
Report on the U.S. intelligence community in the term of effectiveness.  
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A. CAUSES OF REFORM: INTELLIGENCE INEFFECTIVENESS AND 
POPULAR PRESSURE 
Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton argue that, “September 11, 2001, was a 
day of unprecedented shock and suffering in the history of the United States … [for 
which] the nation was unprepared.”251 Although major attacks on American soil had 
happened before—notably the Japanese bombardment of Pearl Harbor in December 
1941—9/11 opened the eyes of the people of United States to the reality that offensive 
actions could happen in their own homes in the modern era despite a sophisticated 
intelligence apparatus, arguably the best that ever existed, at their government’s disposal. 
This event raised two questions among the political elite and the general public alike: 
“How did this happen, and how can we avoid such tragedy again?”252 Congress and the 
president established the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks (the 9/11 
Commission) to answer those questions with the passage of Public Law 107-306 on 
November 27, 2002.253 
The U.S. intelligence community had not seriously focused on terrorism threats 
that led to the 9/11 attacks until a series of bombings targeted the United States’ 
embassies in 1998.254 Since then, the intelligence community had provided U.S. 
policymakers with broad continuing information about Al-Qaeda activities.255 In fact, the 
CIA had successfully planted an agent inside Al-Qaeda in 1999, although, the penetration 
did not reach Al-Qaeda cores in a timely manner.256 The intelligence community had 
been working on the problem in accordance with current capabilities and expectations. 
Nonetheless, it was insufficient to prevent the attack. 
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One of the first responses that emerged from the analysis of the 9/11 attacks held 
that U.S. intelligence had failed—somehow. Overall intelligence failures had happened 
because the intelligence community was not effective in doing its job. Opinions varied as 
to just where the point of failure occurred. Robert Jervis argued that the intelligence 
failure arose from the differences between the prediction and the actual event.257 On the 
other hand, Roberta Wohlstetter offers the explanation on intelligence failure in Pearl 
Harbor that intelligence failed because the intelligence community received too much 
information to be analyzed.258 Wohlstetter further explains that too much irrelevant 
information collected by the intelligence community made it impossible to recognize the 
important reports in time.259 Thus, she concludes that adequate intelligence was almost 
impossible to achieve.260 Betts takes a more critical position by saying that the failure of 
intelligence was natural.261 Paul R. Pillar agrees with Betts’ assessment that the U.S. 
intelligence community did not do its job properly to protect the nation regarding 9/11.262 
James Wirtz argues that 9/11 happened because all the nations’ components did not learn 
from what happened in Pearl Harbor decades before.263  
Intelligence failures and successes are highly determined by how the intelligence 
community provides the right information at the right time so that the policymakers can 
make the right decision at the right time. Hence, policymakers’ attitudes on intelligence 
failures or successes needed to be examined regarding the 9/11 attacks. The cloud 
surrounding the understanding of why 9/11 happened was thick and full of blame for the 
intelligence community; regardless, the intelligence entities had some share of the blame 
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for the failures that led to the 9/11. Betts claims that the 9/11 attacks were the United 
States’ intelligence community biggest failure since the Pearl Harbor attack.264 Betts 
argues that intelligence failed regarding the 9/11 event because the intelligence 
community could not provide specific information about the attack.265 Erik J. Dahl 
echoes Betts’ idea by stating that the intelligence community failed to prevent the attack 
because it did not provide actionable intelligence to prevent the attack.266 Furthermore, 
Dahl adds that policymakers failed to give adequate attention to information from the 
intelligence community,267 which suggests that the failure of the intelligence community 
to convince policymakers of the seriousness of the risk may also be considered as an 
intelligence failure.  
In his account, Dahl states that the 9/11 attacks were the combination of too broad 
strategic intelligence information from the intelligence community and the reluctance of 
policymakers to accept the information related to the attack.268 Dahl argues that the 
policymakers’ level of acceptance of the information about Al-Qaeda was quite high, but 
there was not precise intelligence that could convince them to take significant action 
against it.269 
The personalities of the politicians and political appointees in leading roles in the 
intelligence community as well as the character and emphases of respective presidential 
administrations affected the receptiveness of policymakers to intelligence information in 
advance of the 9/11 attacks. In 1998, the administration, under President Bill Clinton, had 
internationally declared that terrorism was the number one United States security 
priority.270 Also, the plan to conquer Al-Qaeda and the authorization to kill Osama bin 
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Laden had been released.271 Nonetheless, the CIA and the military were reluctant to 
follow up on the president’s desire.272  
In President George W. Bush’s administration, the initial level of concern over 
terrorist threats was lower than in Clinton’s administration.273 Clinton had personally 
communicated his belief in the seriousness of a possible Al-Qaeda attack to Bush in 
December 2000.274 From January to September 10, 2001, the IC leaders had been trying 
to convince the National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, and other key 
policymakers, including the president, about the possibility of Al-Qaeda attacks on 
American soil.275 For his part, however, President Bush used the phrase “swatting at 
flies” to describe fighting terrorists.276 President Bush was clearly taking the threat 
lightly before 9/11 became real. 
Bush’s administration was more concerned about inter-state threats than terrorist 
threats.277 Specifically, The Washington Post reported that the “Bush administration did 
not do enough to pursue Al-Qaeda before September 11, 2001, and has neglected the war 
on terrorism since then because of an obsession with wagging war on Iraq.”278 James 
Moore writes that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld used the terrorist attacks on 9/11 
as a “rationale” for the United States to invade Iraq.279 Instead of focusing on terrorist 
threats, the first reaction of President Bush after the 9/11 attacks was to demonstrate 
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America’s supremacy by focusing on Iraq.280 The reason to invade Iraq, eliminating 
banned weaponry, has never been proven valid. Very few people in the CIA and the 
Pentagon believed that the weapons allegedly owned by Iraq existed.281 Incoherent 
strategy between the policymakers, the administration, and the intelligence community 
ultimately failed to realize the United States’ first priority: protecting the homeland from 
direct attack.   
Thus, a picture of the dysfunction between the intelligence community and 
policymakers emerges. Figure 2 from Dahl reflects the relations between the general 
intelligence information and low receptivity of the policymaker resulted in the likelihood 
of terrorist attacks:  
Figure 2.  Relations between Intelligence and Policymakers’ Attitudes 
Adapted from Erik J. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor 
to 9/11 and Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 25.  
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Policymakers passively received information about Al-Qaeda threats prior to 
9/11. Zegart states that from 1991 to 2001, “There were many canaries in the coal 
mine.”282 Despite these warnings, policymakers were reluctant to act on U.S. counter-
terrorism deficiencies uncovered by the combination of “twelve different blue ribbon 
commissions, think tank task forces, and governmental initiatives.”283 They had made 
340 recommendations to reform the American intelligence community that focused on 
counterterrorism.284 Interestingly, the same shortcomings stood out in the findings of the 
9/11 Commission Report and House and Senate Intelligence Committee after 9/11.285 
With all the warnings provided, the policymakers could not make a single significant 
policy to deter or prevent Al-Qaeda’s threats before 9/11. The relation between the 
policymakers and intelligence community was inadequate. The intelligence community, 
as the expert on intelligence matters, had tried unsuccessfully to convince the 
policymakers about the threat posed by the Al-Qaeda.  
B. PROCESS 
On September 14, 2001, the President declared a national emergency,286 and 
Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the President “to use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” of September 11,287 which the 
president signed on September 18.288 The nation’s politicians suddenly united in some 
key respects and faced the same direction—toward the enemy—but they diverged 
significantly in regards to the 9/11 Commission. Despite popular clamor for answers and 
assurances, U.S. politicians took almost a year to agree on a commission to investigate 
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the 9/11 attacks. While the commission had firmly stated assignments, the significant 
political infighting for the sake of political interests reflects how the commission was 
built by political agreement, not from pure goodwill in solving the real problem.  
The 9/11 Commission Chairman and the Vice Chairman, Thomas H. Kean and 
Lee H. Hamilton, cited among the reasons for the delay a series of “false starts.”289 The 
final composition of the 9/11 Commission was five Republicans and five Democrats with 
a Republican as a chairman and a Democrat as a vice-chairman. The composition was 
designed to build a bipartisan commission, and the Chair and Vice-Chair worked hard to 
avoid partisanship in the Commission. After all, the purpose of the Commission was not 
to open a new arena for political interests, but to find the truth and absorb all the political 
interests reflected from the equal numbers of the commissioners. The commissioners 
appointed were political figures, and had hardly any experience in a security-related 
environment, except former Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee Lee 
Hamilton, and former Secretary of Navy John F. Lehman.     
The main opposition to the creation of an independent commission was the then 
administration, the George W. Bush White House. In the spring of 2002, legislation for 
an independent commission had been brought up in the Congress.290 Nonetheless, the 
White House opposed its creation.291 The White House grew concerned that an 
independent commission would affect the administration’s credibility in defending the 
nation; worse, the government might find itself blamed for the failure to prevent 9/11. 
Indeed, the White House hoped that the appointees to the Commission’s top slots 
would give the administration some leverage in the result.292 For example, the executive 
director for the 9/11 Commission, Philip Zelikow, was known to have close bonds with 
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the National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice.293 The Commission was a part-time 
working commission. Although the commissioners would have to authorize all the 
documents released by the commission, the Commission assignments were not their only 
concern. Zelikow led the dedicated Commission staff. Moreover, when the Commission 
seemed to be acting against the president’s wishes, according to one well-placed critic, 
the White House counsel’s office was not above “stonewalling.”294 Richard Ben-Veniste 
argues that the Republican-led Congress imposed time and budget constraints on the 
Commission to protect the chances of a second-term Republican presidency.295 In short, 
the focus of the White House was not to find the facts and causes of the terrorist attacks 
on 9/11, but to uphold the administration’s legitimacy in the political realm.    
Other factors slowed the start of the Commission’s work.  The first-choice 
designees for the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the 9/11 Commission resigned their 
positions early in the process. The White House proposed Dr. Henry Kissinger, one of the 
best-known diplomats in the world, as the head of 9/11 Commission.296 The Senate 
majority leader chose George Mitchell as the vice chair for the 9/11 Commission.297 
Congress had demanded that the commissioners disclose any potential outsider influence, 
which included clients that contributed more than $5,000 to the commissioners’ private 
practices.298 Thus, on December 20, 2002, Kissinger had a visit from 9/11 victim families 
known as the Family Steering Committee (FSC) to question Kissinger’s clients in his 
consulting agency in order to ensure that he would work to find the truth and disclose his 
ties with his clients.299 For example, the families demanded that he acknowledge Osama 
bin Laden’s family’s business corporation as a client.300 The next day, he resigned from 
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the job of 9/11 Commission chairman.301 Similarly, Mitchell, who owned a law firm, 
resigned soon thereafter for the exact same reason: refusal to release his client list.302  
Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton who took over as the Chief and Vice Chief 
of the 9/11 Commission had their concerns about the task that they had to achieve, from 
their skeptical perspective. The 9/11 Commission would evaluate almost all of the U.S. 
government as well as the private sector considered to be involved in the failure of 
preventing 9/11.303 Public demands, especially the victims’ families, also constrained the 
day-to-day working of the Commission.304 The process of the investigation would also 
infringe on the current active effort against terrorism in the world and the nation’s 
preparation to go to war in Iraq.305 The Commission had to look at the government’s 
secret files,306 and to question government top officials politically invested in the 
administration.307 The Commission leadership realized that the tasks at hand were 
enormous, but the capabilities and confidence at their disposal were minimal. This 
imbalance would definitely affect the working quality of the Commission.  
On the other hand, the pressure against intelligence reform came strongly from the 
Pentagon, especially the idea to relocate several intelligence agencies under the authority 
of the Secretary of Defense to the Director of Intelligence.308 Also, the Pentagon was not 
in favor of establishing a strong national intelligence director because a strong 
intelligence director would take over DOD’s control over defense intelligence agencies 
and the budget that comes with the agencies.309 The House and Senate Armed Services 
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Committee joined the Pentagon stance for mostly the same reasons.310 In the end, the 
enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act of 2004 became reality. 
Nonetheless, accommodating Pentagon’s disagreement, the Congress decided to deny 
giving the new national intelligence director the authority to control the national 
intelligence budget and personnel.311  
During this period, pressures in the investigation process came from more than 
one direction: the White House, Congress, and the FSC. The White House never really 
cooperated with the 9/11 Commission. The Congress continually inquired about its 
progress, and partisanship in Congress created pressure on the commissioners for 
particular political agendas. The FSC was constantly, and sometimes too aggressively, 
assisting the Commission’s efforts in the investigation.312 The influences affecting the 
9/11 Commission to find the truth mostly reflect, on one hand, the agenda of political 
opponents to blame President Bush’s administration and the agenda to put the blame on 
the intelligence community to save the administration’s political prospects.313 
C. RESULT 
The 9/11 Commission investigated the significance of several federal agencies, 
but heavily focused on the lack of authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.314 
Specifically, it found structural obstacles for networking that reflected the highly divisive 
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work environment in agencies.315 First, the intelligence agencies in the United States 
focused on their own specific task in collecting intelligence, which was far from 
combining the result of their work.316 Second, the intelligence community had a division 
between foreign and domestic intelligence operations in standards and practices.317 The 
intelligence community lacked communication to each other because of different 
standards of collecting, processing, reporting, sharing, and analyzing intelligence.318  
Third, there was a division in managing national intelligence community 
operations where the capabilities for the whole nation were divided among different 
departments.319 The example was the allocation of resources from the National Security 
Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and the National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) for national intelligence. These three agencies worked 
under the Secretary of Defense, which made the distribution of their collections hardly 
within the reach of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).320 Fourth, ineffectiveness 
in prioritizing missions and allocating logistics were based on departments’ foci.321 Each 
department that had its own intelligence agency worked based on its own set of priorities 
and not based on national security priorities.322  
Fourth, multiple duties of the DCI made the duties were unachievable.323 The 
DCI was the Director of the CIA working simultaneously as the coordinator of all the 
national intelligence agencies and as the primary intelligence adviser to the president.324 
Lastly, a complicated and secretive community, the intelligence community was 
organizationally hard to understand with its fifteen different agencies and hardly open to 
                                                 
315 9/11 Commission Report, 408. 
316 Ibid. 







324 Ibid., 410. 
 59 
public accounts.325 These six shortfalls of the intelligence community motivated the 9/11 
Commission to strongly recommend an overhaul of the U.S. intelligence community. 
To address the gaps, the 9/11 Commission proposed placing the DNI and the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) directly under the president.326 Furthermore, 
the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) would coordinate United States 
intelligence entities, divided into three large groups, to recruit, train, acquire, equip and 
work in the field.327 The first group, to be led by a deputy intelligence director (NID) for 
foreign intelligence who also was the CIA director, would coordinate the function of the 
CIA and a new agency called the open source agency.328 The second deputy would 
coordinate defense intelligence agencies, which consisted of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, the NSA, the NGA, the NRO, and “other” agencies (see Figure 3).329 The third 
group would be led by a deputy for homeland intelligence who headed Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) intelligence and counter intelligence departments and also the 
intelligence agencies under the Department of Homeland Security.330 Figure 3 displays 
the proposed structure for the intelligence community reform in the United States from 
the 9/11 Commission. 
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Figure 3.  Recommendation for the Structure of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community from the 9/11 Commission 
 
Adapted from National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 
Commission Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 413. 
The most important change produced by the 9/11 Commission’s 
recommendations in 2004 is the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 that dictated the establishment of the Director of National 
Intelligence Director (DNI) at the level of a cabinet position, a separate position from the 
Director of the CIA, and of functional centers under the supervision of the ODNI.331 The 
DNI that led the ODNI was a new bureaucratic layer directly under the President of the 
United States in order to increase control and coordination of the intelligence 
community.332  
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The roles of the DNI include leading the intelligence community; acting as 
primary intelligence advisor to the president; serving as a member of National Security 
Council (NSC); inspecting and formulating the National Intelligence Program’s budget 
based on the intelligence agencies programs--except for the military intelligence, which 
still fell under the DOD. The DNI also is responsible for creating a standard for the 
intelligence missions and priorities in regards of the intelligence cycle; guaranteeing the 
quality of intelligence provided to the executive leaderships and relevant law makers; 
evaluating the intelligence community cooperation with foreign partners; ensuring the 
effectiveness of intelligence collections and analysis for national security; managing 
human resources among the intelligence community; inspecting the joint acquisition 
between the ODNI and DOD;333 when necessary, giving names to the president for 
intelligence agency leadership nominations; taking charge of paramilitary activity 
assigned to the DOD; and executing the spending of funds and dispersing the funds and 
human resources as the director sees fit.334  
The CIA Director works separately from the DNI to enhance the U.S. espionage 
capability.335 The Director of the CIA now has the responsibility to oversee the 
intelligence community in its clandestine operations across the U.S. intelligence 
services.336 Furthermore, the CIA had lost its exclusive role in presenting the president’s 
daily intelligence briefing; providing a daily report to the president now falls to the DNI 
as the main intelligence adviser to the president.337         
In order to improve the intelligence and security unity in a network-based 
institution, the ODNI led the functional centers: the National Counterterrorism Center, 
the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), and the National Counterintelligence 
Executive (NCIX). The establishment of the NCTC was primarily aimed at enhancing the 
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analytic ability of the combination of foreign and domestic intelligence in order to 
counter terrorism.338 In regards to counterterrorism intelligence operations and analysis, 
the NCTC reports to the DNI and to the president on counterterrorism policy.339 The 
NCPC was established to provide a focus on United States national entities, including the 
private sector, related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons 
threats.340 The NCIX coordinates the whole national counterintelligence enterprise, 
including states, local, and tribal institutions.341   
The second recommendation captured in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act is sharing information. The Act, regarding to information sharing, 
dictated an establishment of a sharing network among government agencies including 
federal, state, and local agencies and also relevant private entities.342 To better achieve 
the NCIX missions, local governments ran 77 fusion centers across the United States to 
absorb and share the relevant information regarding security matters from all sources as 
well as to coordinate the counterterrorism effort of federal, state, and local law 
enforcement; intelligence community representatives; public health sector; and fire 
departments.343 
The 9/11 Commission found problems in the overall intelligence community and 
gave recommendations to reform intelligence community. The recommendations for 
intelligence reform focused on two areas: establishment of a new layer of bureaucracy 
and information sharing. The lawmakers captured the recommendations related to 
intelligence reform and pass those into law in a fast manner.  
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D. IMPLEMENTATION 
The Intelligence Reform Act passed in 2004 was designed to protect the nation 
from further terrorist attacks by focusing on reforming the effectiveness of the United 
States intelligence community, including defense intelligence agencies. Scholars concur 
on the ineffectiveness of the intelligence community, but differ somewhat over its causes. 
Some emphasize the failings of the intelligence agencies themselves, and others blame 
the civilian leadership for failing to manage them properly.  
More than ten years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, proponents of reform still are 
not fully confident that the United States has been firmly protected from terrorist attacks, 
even after the death of Osama bin Laden. Too much of the success in preventing further 
attacks, in their view, depends on luck.344 The reform of the intelligence community 
enacted in 2004, based on the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, had not changed 
much—neither how the intelligence community works nor how insecure the public feels. 
The reform of the intelligence community created by civilians through public law has not 
make the intelligence community more effective than it was prior to 9/11. 
The 9/11 Commissioners attempted to assess implementation of their 
recommendations through a non-profit organization named the Public Discourse Project 
(PDP) to ensure the implementation of their recommendations.345 In 2005, the 9/11 
Commission members started their oversight programs to evaluate the reform that they 
had proposed to the administration.346 However, after the 9/11 Commission ended, the 
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Commission lost its security clearances and legal authority to oversee its work.347 The 
White House, for example, informed the PDP that they would treat them like any other 
non-profit organization.348 After several rejections from the government, the effort to 
observe the reform reached its conclusion in October 2005.349 Kean and Hamilton, the 
chair and vice chair of the 9/11 Commission, stated that the “director of National 
Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism Center were up and running, but both had 
a long way to go in addressing critical issues such as information sharing and building a 
unified community.”350 As noted earlier, Betts argues that the United States as a whole 
tried to fix the problem by throwing money and resources at the intelligence community, 
which led to unsuccessful reform.351 In Zegart’s opinion, the intelligence community has 
changed after the enactment of the law but most parts of it have seen no progress, while 
some are moving backwards.352    
Thomas H. Kean’s words when he was addressing the public on 5 December 2005 
about the development of the reform reflect more frustration than optimism. He stated:  
[M]any obvious steps that the American people assume have been 
completed, have not been. Our leadership is distracted. Some of these 
failures are shocking. Four years after 9/11: It is scandalous that the police 
and firefighters in large cities still cannot communicate reliably on a major 
crisis. It is scandalous that airline passengers are still not screened against 
all names on the terrorist watch list. It is scandalous that we still allocate 
scarce homeland security dollars on the basis of pork barrel spending, not 
risk … [w]e believe that the terrorists will strike again. If they do, and 
these reforms have not been implemented, what will our excuses be? 
While the terrorists are learning and adapting, our government is still 
moving at a crawl.353 
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Later on, the PDP released a report card with letter grades to define the development of 
the reform.354 The intelligence community reform score fell short of expectations.  
The Director of National Intelligence received a B because it was already in place 
and running. Nonetheless, the DNI still needed to work on transforming the lack of 
sharing of intelligence, reforming the intelligence community, and unifying efforts 
among intelligence agencies as soon as possible.355 The NCTC earned a B for its 
collaboration in analysis and evaluation even when under-funded and lacking 
resources.356 The FBI received a C for its slow progress in reforming the organization.357 
The CIA director in the reform received an “[i]ncomplete” grade for absence of a positive 
outcome.358 Information sharing was graded a D for its minimal implementation in the 
intelligence community.359 Congressional oversight of intelligence reform scored a D 
because, at that moment, the oversight subcommittee for intelligence reform had not been 
created.360 The declassification of the intelligence budget in Congress had not been 
touched and scored an F.361 The accumulation of grades indicated that the reform of the 
United States intelligence dictated by public law crawled along at a desperately slow rate. 
Improved effectiveness of the intelligence community as a result of the reform had barely 
been achieved. 
The intelligence community bureaucratic reform dictated by the 9/11 Commission 
seems almost impossible to implement. One of the problems in United States defense 
reform is a highly politicized environment that made the mission to protect the nation 
heavily influenced by political competition.362 Instead of working to create a more 
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effective intelligence community, the DNI and CIA directors had their own bureaucratic 
competition.363 Dennis Blair, a former DNI, argues that:  
The CIA has often used the leverage and influence left over from its days 
of dominance to act independently, undercutting the authority of the DNI 
and attempting to gain leadership of community intelligence activities or 
to act independently of them. The CIA often used its direct relationship 
with the White House, Congress, and the intelligence services of other 
countries for this purpose.364  
The dispute between the DNI and CIA has been mostly won by the CIA with the support 
of the White House.365 Not only has the CIA challenged DNI’s bureaucratic position, but 
the administration also failed to enforce the DNI’s authority over the CIA as dictated by 
law. 
The other pressing issue was DNI authority power over the intelligence 
community budget. Constant friction prevailed between the DNI and Secretary of 
Defense on the intelligence community budget, especially the intelligence missions 
performed under the DOD.366 For example, the DNI held the authority for major 
acquisitions regarding the intelligence community under DOD procurement; nonetheless, 
such procurement required Secretary of Defense authorization.367 The authority by law to 
control the national intelligence program vested in the DNI came with the absence of 
budgetary control power.368 The absent of budgetary control meant the DNI could not 
fully control the intelligence community as a whole through leverage. 
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The implementation of the intelligence reform remains unsatisfying. Amy Zegart 
argues that some of the intelligence reforms failed, were counterproductive, and have not 
improved much.369 The examples of ineffective intelligence community in mitigating 
terrorist threats were the 2009 Fort Hood shootings and Christmas Day bombing, as well 
as the 2010 Times Square car bomb.370  
Many experts have stressed the lack of collaboration and information sharing 
among U.S. intelligence agencies. In 2002, Steven L. Salazar argued that, “America’s 
intelligence efforts, although well-meaning and well-funded, are not organized to support 
national security effectively.”371 Salazar added that the intelligence agencies in the 
United States were like neighbors, in that sometimes they shared information and 
sometimes they did not.372 Richard K. Betts puts these criticisms more forcefully, 
arguing that the United States, after the 9/11 reform, has only thrown money at its 
intelligence community, rather than creating effectiveness in the community.373 Betts 
cites such examples as the FBI’s reluctance to change its organizational culture or 
unexploited collected information in the NSA after huge incentives for the new program 
from Congress.374  
James R. Clapper, Jr , Director of National Intelligence and a retired U.S. Air 
Force Lieutenant General, argues that after 9/11, the United States intelligence 
community has improved, but still need some areas to work includes intelligence 
acquisition, analytical tradecraft, security-clearance reform, security and counter 
intelligence, collaboration, and relationships with foreign partners.375 While Clapper 
suggests the intelligence institutions have become more effective, Betts criticizes the 
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effectiveness of the intelligence reform, particularly as gauged by performance.376 These 
criticisms show that the intelligence community, although institutionally established, still 
lacks effectiveness in collaborative efforts necessary to protect the nation.  
Zegart looks at intelligence ineffectiveness from a different perspective than that 
of Salazar, Clapper and Betts. She argues, in line with Salazar and Betts, that, “The 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 started with high hopes but 
ended up producing only modest changes.”377 In her view, however, the key issue is that 
executive and legislative branch leaders use their role in intelligence oversight for narrow 
political gains, rather than for the national interest. Zegart argues: “Ten years after 9/11, 
the United States has an intelligence oversight system that is well-designed to serve the 
re-election interests of individual legislators and protects congressional committee 
prerogatives, but poorly designed to serve the national interest.”378  
It is not mainly the intelligence community’s actions that cause its ineffectiveness, 
in Zegart’s view. Congress’ role in governing the intelligence community, in her view is 
the key problem. It needs to be enhanced, if not overhauled, to focus more on oversight 
rather than narrow political interests.379 Zegart, furthermore, argues that good legislative 
oversight will ensure that the intelligence community receives necessary resources and 
deploys them to maximum effect.380 It also will help agencies set strategic priorities and 
force them to improve by asking hard questions and demanding better answers.381 Better 
oversight also would help ensure that the intelligence community abides by the law, 
thereby helping the agencies to gain public trust, while by necessity hiding what they 
do.382  
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Zegart focuses on three traditional challenges that prevent maximum 
implementation of intelligence reformation in the United States. These challenges are 
“bureaucratic resistance, tepid presidential support, and opposition from key 
congressional committee chairmen who stood to lose and had the power to resist.” 383 In 
sum, Zegart emphasizes the issue of politicization intelligence by civilian politicians 
more than bureaucratic politics causing U.S. intelligence institutions to be ineffective.  
Sudden reform with political ramifications at every level of bureaucracy created a 
conflict of interests among civilian and security officials. The implementation of the 
Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 was inadequate because of 
bureaucratic resistance influenced by “organizations structures, cultures, and 
incentives.”384 Thus, the intent of the reform—to protect the United States from terrorist 
attacks—has barely achieved its goals.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The attempt to reform the U.S. intelligence community after 9/11 appears to 
resemble a political circus. Zegart says, “The crux of the problem lies in the enduring 
realities of American politics, and success requires finding ways to overcome them.”385 
The cause of the reform was that 9/11 happened because of weak relations among the 
intelligence agencies and between the intelligence community and Bush administration. 
The intelligence agencies had given the warning to the civilian leaders and received little 
positive feedback.  
Since the beginning of the 9/11 Commission until the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 law passed, the focus of the national elites are mostly 
on their narrow political interests. The 9/11 Commission was formed mostly because the 
people, especially the victims’ family, wanted it, not the national elites. The 
implementation of the law has been progressing slowly; the intelligence bureaucracies 
                                                 
383 Zegart, Eyes on Spies, 170–1. 
384 Ibid., 196. 
385 Zegart, Spying Blind, 197. 
 70 
have continuously resist changes. Institution parochialism and partisan interests are the 
main concern of the nation’s elites.  
 71 
IV. CONCLUSION 
When narrow political interests become involved, national security comes in 
second. Stephen Krasner argues that, “The United States has a strong society but a weak 
state … [t]he central features of American politics is the fragmentation and dispersion of 
power and authority.”386 A weak state could be beneficial to accommodate differences 
and create better policies.387 Nevertheless, narrow interests of political and defense elites 
that may come into play in determining national security policies seem to result in 
ineffective defense institutions.  
This thesis investigated civil-military relations in the United States through efforts 
to reform the defense sectors of the military and intelligence agencies. The enactment of 
the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 reformed the military. The 9/11 
Commission Recommendations significantly motivated United States civilian leaders in 
the legislative and executive branches to pass the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2014. These laws show vividly the actual state of civil-military 
relations in the United States. The two case studies show how civilians, the executive 
leaders and the legislators, often put their political interests ahead of military and 
intelligence effectiveness. Also, the two case studies show that the military and 
intelligence community are equally as political as the civilian bodies. These agencies 
themselves, in acting to pursue their narrow bureaucratic interests, put political influence 
and budgetary control ahead of national security effectiveness. The political bargaining 
process of the executive and legislative branches, heavily influenced by political 
preferences of the military and intelligence agencies, determined the policy governing 
security institutions in the United States. Thus, the reforms failed to reach most of their 
objectives from the very beginning of their process.  
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While civilian control over security entities, in this case the military and 
intelligence institution, in the United States is not at stake,388 the dynamics between 
civilians and the military in the United States is still shape the policy outcomes that 
govern the defense communities. In the United States, the military serves two civilian 
institutions: the executive and the legislative.389 When issues arise regarding the 
effectiveness of the military, the two political bodies, the executive and legislative, try to 
resolve the issues collectively, which is both proper, but also problematic.390 It is 
problematic because the process of reform naturally attempts to absorb all the narrow 
political interests from the elites, including the administration, the legislative, and the 
military and intelligence community. In the process of reforming the security institutions, 
political interests from the people who serve in Congress, the administration, and the 
military and intelligence community, play out. Consequently, the determinants of reform 
rely on the compromises between political entities. Reform can only occur when the 
terms of reform are acceptable to all the parties involved in the process. 
Narrow political interests often meant that defense reform was designed to 
achieve these political results, not to improve the effectiveness of the defense institutions. 
In this situation, the military and intelligence leaders tend to pick a side in the political 
arena, either supporting the executive or legislative branches.391 Consequently, the 
military and intelligence agencies have room to influence defense policy, which 
according to experts, diminishes civilian control over these defense institutions..392 At 
least in the last two notable security reforms, reform happened when the legislative 
branches noticed serious ineffectiveness in the security institutions. On balance, this 
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thesis assesses that the main cause of the ineffectiveness of the military and intelligence 
community are their pursuit of their parochial interests that blocked more effective 
reforms.  
Notable failures of the defense sectors triggered reform. When these failures 
became a important national issue, political efforts emerged to satisfy popular calls for 
action. In this situation, the process of determining the shape of reform becomes highly 
important. Parochial political interests collide in the process of finding the problems and 
trying to fix them. The administration tends to find ways to avoid blame from Congress, 
especially from their political opponents, and opponents in Congress tend to look for 
problems that can be blamed on the administration. Parochial political agreements create 
a reform process in the form of legislation. The U.S. military and intelligence community 
have accepted full civilian control but both seek to keep their pre-reform autonomy.393 
A. CAUSES  
This thesis indicates what may be a pattern of reform in the U.S. defense sector, at 
least with respect to the last two reforms, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the 
9/11 Commission Report. The effort to reform defense institutions in the United States, 
historically, starts with the poor performance of defense institutions.  
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 came about from great concerns in the 
legislature over military failures in the field and mismanagement at home. Thus, the 
lawmakers focused on passing a bill that would overhaul the entire DOD. The 
ineffectiveness of the military became the main issue here. Also, the series of failures 
convinced the legislators that the DOD not only needed to be fixed but also that the 
reform needed to be dictated by the rule of law, which is the highest form of civilian 
control in a democratic nation.394 This condition meant that the lawmakers, who were the 
representatives of the people, were unsure whether the administration had sufficient 
power or political will to dictate reform in the military. Even with glaring military 
failures and mismanagement, it took four years of intense bargaining over the substance 
                                                 
393 Owen, “Military Officers Need to Know,” 71.  
394 Bruneau, Patriots for Profit, 83. 
 74 
of the reform bill before lawmakers achieved an outcome that accommodate as much as it 
could the parochial interests of military, executive and legislative elites.  
The 9/11 attacks captured the whole world’s attention. Nonetheless, instead of 
focusing on fixing the security sectors, the administration first priority was to seek 
punishment of the attackers. The hardest push for reform came from the constituents 
related to the victims.395 Thus, the lawmakers representing the people tried to find ways 
to create a commission that would investigate the tragedy and find the defects in the U.S. 
security system. The 9/11 Commission formed after almost a year of the attack to find 
what was wrong, if anything. The intelligence community was the first institution that 
was mentioned in the report; the intelligence community had been considered a failure in 
detecting the attack.396 
Tension between the civilian leadership and the defense community in the causes 
of intelligence reform was high because, at this point, the intelligence community took 
the blame for the attacks. It also, to some extent, resisted changes for parochial political 
reasons. The failures in both case studies made the civilians distrust the defense sector’s 
capability to operate effectively and reform itself. While the military and executive 
branch leaders both sought to deflect mandated reform of U.S. defense and intelligence 
institutions, lawmakers and the 9/11 commissioners insisted that these institutions needed 
to change and that the only way to ensure the civilians that they would change was 
mandating defense reform through the rule of law.    
B. PROCESS 
The process of reforming security sectors in the United States highlights the 
contending political interests involved in civilian governance of the defense sector. While 
the averred purpose of reform was to fix the improve effectiveness of the national 
security institutions, political interests significantly constrained this process. The 
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 resulted from a complex political bargaining process. 
Also, the 9/11 Commission Report reflected a political bargain between the 
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administration, the military elites, and Congress. All U.S. political elites involved, 
including the executive branch, the military, intelligence community and legislature, had 
their own political agendas in the reform process. As a result, the focus in reforming the 
defense sector for the sake of the nation became a lesser priority. Parochial political 
interests unrelated to defense effectiveness infused the process of reforming the defense 
community.397 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 exemplified political collisions between 
political and military elites in the United States, involving active military officers in the 
midst of the debate. The administration challenged the Congress’s bid to reform the 
military by law. Congress responded to calls for a few senior military officers for a 
defense overhaul. The reform ideas came from these generals, who had already achieved 
everything they could achieve in their military careers. Generals newly appointed by the 
administration, however, rallied behind executive branch as a means to hold onto their 
parochial perquisites. The military shared with the administration the desire to resist 
change and control any organizational changes internally and military leaders actively 
acted out in the process. The generals challenged Congress’ intention to enact a law 
managing the military and displayed emotional imbalance before the legislators,398 one 
of their masters in the democratic, civilian control realm.399 Even though it did not signal 
military disobedience to the civilian authority, enacting the Goldwater-Nichols Act 
revealed strained civil-military relations and the military’s deep involvement in a national 
political process. The military put parochial interests ahead of robust civilian control in 
ensuring improved effectiveness in this specific case.  
The process of reform in the intelligence community from the 9/11 Commission 
Report was mired in political deliberations. Most significantly, the process to decide 
whether the nation needed a commission to investigate the attack in order to find the 
causes of defense failure took too much time. Arguably, without constant pressure from 
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the relatives of the deceased, the Commission would never have been erected.400 The 
appointment of the members and leadership of the Commission showed an extensive 
level of political intrusion, with even the selected chairs doubting the seriousness of the 
commission establishment and influence.401 
The administration did not cooperate in the process of the 9/11 commission 
investigation beyond superficial support.402 The administration was keenly aware that it 
would bear political responsibility for its incapability in keeping the nation secure, if the 
commission found that the administration had ignored terrorist threats in favor of 
pursuing other enemies.403 While the intelligence community insisted that they had given 
sufficient information to the administration to take action in the form of policy, the 
administration consistently pointed fingers at the incapability of the intelligence 
community to provide specific information about the attack.404 Parochial political 
interests in the Pentagon and the CIA interfered with and influenced the legislative 
process in reforming the intelligence community, and robbed the new DNI of significant 
organizational and political clout.  
C. RESULT  
The defense reform processes became final in the form of public law: The 
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the Intelligence Reform and Intelligence Prevention 
Act of 2004. These two results showed, at least to the American public, that the elected 
officials in the White House and Capitol Hill had done something to fix the problems in 
the U.S. defense sector, even though it was imperfect.  
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 dictated an overhaul in the DOD. This Act 
was intended to mainly fix the military senior leadership, reduce inter-service rivalry, 
increase the role of the functional and geographical combatant commander, promote 
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jointness at the military operational level, and redo the management system in the 
DOD.405 The Act was a bitter pill for the administration and the military, but it had been 
passed and had to be followed. Nonetheless, most of the elites achieved their political 
agendas in passage of the Act. The administration and the military received the defense 
budget they desired, and Congress passed one of the most important laws in the United 
States. .    
The 9/11 Commission Report distributed the blame for failures leading to the 
terrorist attacks, and the first institution on the blame list was the intelligence 
community.406 The implementation of the 9/11 Commission report recommendations on 
the intelligence community took only five months to be enacted into law. Law dictated 
that the intelligence community reform the way it operated and added a top layer of 
coordination and supervision. The Act created the new position of DNI, whose main 
functions are to coordinate and oversee the U.S. intelligence community. Also, the Act 
demanded that the intelligence community create an information sharing mechanism. In 
this case, mirroring the previous case of defense reform, political interests played the 
biggest role. Elected officials, executive and legislative, worked together to answer public 
concerns through the establishment of the 9/11 Commission but then worked in a partisan 
fashion to undermine its efforts and recommendations for reform. Particular parts of the 
intelligence community—the Defense Department and the CIA-- sought to influence the 
reform bill so as to reduce the power of the new DNI, thereby undermining the 
effectiveness of the reform process as a whole.  The White House, in particular, aligned 
with the interests and actions of CIA and DOD, to prevent effective implementation of 
the act.   
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D. IMPLEMENTATION 
This thesis demonstrates that defense institutions can significantly influence the 
substance of defense reform and its implementation,407 with unpredictable consequences 
for the U.S. defense effectiveness and even civilian supremacy in U.S. national security 
policy. The Goldwater-Nichols Act, in some way, created internal bureaucratic 
tensions408 and a militarized tendency in foreign policy.409 Also, the DOD struggled to 
formulate effective mechanisms to implement the necessary jointness among services.410 
The Act also created the CJCS, who now only provides a single military entry point for 
advice to civilian leaders. This may eventually create problems in defense decision-
making processes because the advice might be subjective and not reflect the opinions of 
all of the services and combatant commands.411  
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 as the 
implementation of the 9/11 Commission recommendations on intelligence sector, while 
having some good results, also met problems in its implementation. Many people 
believed that the Act did not meet the goal of achieving an effective intelligence 
community.412 Also, the reluctance of the agencies to commit to executing the law is 
high.413 Moreover, the implementation of the law has created organizational tensions, 
especially between the DNI and CIA.414 Another tension appeared in the Pentagon 
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retaining procurement authorization for all intelligence agencies under the DOD, which 
make up the majority in the United States intelligence community. The budget power is 
held by the Secretary of Defense, not the DNI.415 Thus, the DNI has no stick-and-carrot 
power over the majority of the intelligence community.  
The implementation of the law in both case studies showed two things: both laws 
were implemented rather slowly, but organizational tensions arose quickly in the new 
organizational setting. The thesis suggests that maximum effectiveness can not be 
reached in defense reform when elites among civilians and the military focus on parochial 
political interests. Also, unexpected consequences and organizational tensions in the 
implementation arose because communication between the subject of the laws, the 
military, the lawmakers, and the administration, was inadequate and created tension.      
E. IMPLICATIONS 
Political relations among and between civilian and military leaders is a highly 
important factor in reforming security organizations in a democratic nation. The two case 
studies, which covered the two latest defense sector reforms in the United States, showed 
some patterns as the precursors of defense sector reform in the nation. The first pattern 
was the causes of the reform, that is the ineffectiveness of the defense organizations. 
While it is rational to think that ineffectiveness can be solved with reorganization or 
reform, the case studies suggest that bureaucratic struggles over influence and budgets 
combine with parochial and partisan political interests to derail effective reform. Instead 
of detecting or admitting the organizational ineffectiveness and fixing it, the U.S. defense 
sector has tended to resist changes until it was too late. Security reform should be a 
continuing process in the dynamics of a changing security environment,416 not a reactive 
designed around bureaucratic and political careers, or even worse, organizational budgets.  
Secondly, in the process of reorganization led by civilians, the communication 
between civilians and the military was often counter-productive, which reflected the 
quality of civil-military relations in the United States. The tensions in the process of 
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reorganization resulted in ineffective results and imperfect implementation. In achieving 
better results in reorganizing security sectors, robust communication between civilians 
and the military is an important precursor. Although the level of democratic control in the 
United States remains relatively high and stable, the case studies demonstrate that when 
reform efforts are opposed by military and intelligence leaders and key civilian officials 
in the executive branch, the reality of reform will not be as robust as what is written or 
intended on paper. Overcoming parochial interests of civilians and the military in 
reorganizing the security sector is highly important.417 Reaching a positive consensus on 
the need for reform requires a high degree of constant communication and understanding 
between the civilian and the military sectors and a commitment to the national interest in 
effective defense and intelligence capabilities.  
F. FURTHER STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis focuses on analyzing civil-military relations in U.S. security reforms. 
Experts on the United States’ current security sectors are concerned that the U.S. 
government has invested a vast amount of resources in overhauling the defense 
community but has not achieved the desired ends of jointness, effectiveness and 
accountability, which signals the need for further reform.418 A new effort to reorganize 
the U.S. security sector started in 2006. Nonetheless, this effort did not spark enough 
motivation for the security sector stakeholders to act upon it.419 A collaborative effort 
between civilians and the military in reforming the U.S. security sector is strongly needed 
at this moment.  
This thesis’ findings describe the effect of parochial political battles among 
civilian and military leaders on the effectiveness of security sector reform. The analysis 
that this thesis uses would be valuable in analyzing how communication between the 
civilians and the military in the sequences of security sector reform developed in this 
thesis may affect new reform within the U.S. security sector. If the United States reforms 
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its security sector in a reactionary fashion motivated by parochial concerns, then this 
thesis model would be proven legitimate in predicting the pattern of security reform in 
the United States. Furthermore, when motivated by poor performances or ineffectiveness 
of the security sectors, future reform would likely start from civil-military tensions or 
unproductive communication and result in an imperfect implementation of security 
reform.  
Regarding the importance of the security sector in the United States as a world 
leader, this thesis would strongly suggest that an ongoing process of continuous security 
reform be dictated in the form of law. The prerequisite of continuing reform is robust 
communication between civilian and military leaders, as well as control from the 
administration and legislators. Thus, security sector reform would be a continuous 
process, and tensions between civilians and the military in the reform, instead of 
increasing over a one-time outcome, would be lessened through an interative process of 
restructuring. Consequently, in a structured and anticipated security sector reform, lower 
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